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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I offer three essays on macroeconomics with particular attention to the
models of search and matching labor and international financial crisis. In plain words, each essay
can be interpreted as a real-world narrative, with the proper key word of overborrowing, oversaving,
and over job-posting, respectively.
In ”Unemployment and Sovereign Risk”, we introduce a search and matching labor framework
into an otherwise standard sovereign debt model. The interactions between external debt dynamics,
domestic labor market outcomes, and time-consistent fiscal policies are analyzed. The incorpora-
tion of the frictional labor market is shown to improve the models ability to generate empirically
realistic debt level and default frequency. The quantitative impact of high unemployment benefit on
deterring vacancy creation not only outweighs its consumption smoothing effect, but also increases
vulnerability to a sovereign debt crisis.
Financially integrated economies observe a cross-country credit boom prior to financial re-
cessions and a bust after wards. In ”A Two-country model of Banking Crisis”, we presents a
two-country real business cycle model with banking sector where privately known intermediation
efficiency of banks make them heterogeneous and gives rise to an interbank market. Overaccumu-
lation of assets or low productivity in one country may lead to credit freeze in both financially
integrated countries due to the existence of moral hazard and asymmetric information in the in-
terbank market. A ”sail together” financial integration may go into a ”sink together” interbank
credit freeze.
In the homework spirit of exercise, ”Efficient Frictions: from credit to labor market” introduces
ex-ante heterogeneous skilled workers and endogenous labor market participation into a static credit
and labor market search model. In particular, we consider two cases in which workers effectively
share the vacancy cost or not, respectively. In the former case, wage contract is settled after loan
ix
contract and workers proportionately share the vacancy cost due to sequential bargaining protocol.
In the latter case, workers get paid a constant share of the output due to block bargaining protocol.
In both cases, perfect smooth credit is not desired, and a frictional labor market can be welfare
improving. Hosios condition is only restored when workers effectively share the vacancy cost.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I will give a brief overview of the three essays on macroeconomics in my
dissertation.
In Chapter 2, my job market paper called ”Unemployment and Sovereign Risk”, we intro-
duce the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) labor search framework into an otherwise stan-
dard Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) sovereign debt model to address two questions: (i) how default
risk and fiscal policy affect the labor market outcomes, and (ii) how a tax-financed unemployment
benefit scheme affects default decision and sovereign spreads. The answer to these two questions
are important in that it may shed light upon the recent debate on whether the government should
prefer stimulus over austerity policies during the financial crisis. In particular, our model addresses
the trade-off faced with the government of whether to stabilize the labor market or stabilize the
whole economy. In this narrative, government mainly provides unemployment benefit to unem-
ployed workers, the proceeds of which are financed through a macro-prudential style capital control
tax imposed on the household’s debt borrowing from the international financial market. A po-
tential overborrowing issue is thus addressed through the tax by making household internalize the
pecuniary externality, i.e., the effects of their borrowing decisions on the cost of debt. However,
the sovereign government is unable to commit to repay its debt due to limited enforcement and
commitment. As a result, when the economy is hit by a large enough negative productivity shock,
the government may decide to default and the country will then fall into financial autarky with an
explicit output penalty so as to sustain the sovereign borrowing in the first place. There are two
main findings in our paper when we calibrate the model to Argentina economy. First, the incor-
poration of a frictional labor market improves the model’s quantitative performance to generate
empirically realistic level of debt (around 60% debt-to-GDP ratio) and default frequency (every 40
years). Second, the provision of unemployment benefit deters firms’ vacancy creation in the labor
2
market and makes the country more vulnerable to negative shocks, the effect of which outweighs
its consumption smoothing benefit, and makes the country more likely to default. Our model can
serve as a framework for analyzing various stabilization and social-insurance policies in the context
of sovereign debt crisis.
In Chapter 3, a joint work with Mohammad Hasan called ”A Two-country Model of Banking
Crises”, we extend Boissay et al. (2016) closed-economy version of the banking crisis model to a two-
country world economy framework and address international banking crisis with potential contagion
and spillover effect through the financially integrated interbank market. In this paper, banks play
an otherwise trivial role by absorbing deposits from household and making loans to firms in the
retail sector. However, a non-negligible interbank market emerges due to the heterogeneity in banks’
intermediation abilities in which relatively more efficient banks borrow funds from those inefficient
ones and in turn extend leveraged loans to firms. With moral hazard and incomplete information
prevailing in the interbank market, an incentive compatible interbank loan contract gives rise to
the so-called ”absorbing capacity” of the whole economy. A potential oversaving problem from
households out of the consumption-smoothing motive following a sequence of positive but small
productivity shocks exacerbates overaccumulation of assets. As a result, a negative productivity
shock brings the economy’s absorbing capacity down below the highly-built pre-crisis asset level
and aggravates the interbank market frictions. An increasing number of inefficient banks now find
it profitable to borrow in the interbank market and then deviate and repudiate the corresponding
loan contract. The interbank credit thus freezes, a financial accelerator mechanism takes in effect,
and a financial crisis ensues. In our world economy framework, we consider cases in which the
two countries are integrated with mobile deposits only, mobile corporate loans only, or a shared
interbank market only. In the last case, one country that experiences a negative shock may drags
down the other country together into an international financial crisis through the contagion effect
from the connected frozen interbank market. Our quantitative exercise shows that financial crisis
occurs less frequently but becomes more severe in the context of a financially integrated world.
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In Chapter 4, ”Efficient Frictions: From Credit to Labor Market”, we introduce ex-ante hetero-
geneous skilled workers and endogenous labor market participation a la Albrecht et al. (2010) into
a single-period version of credit and labor market search model as in Wasmer and Weil (2004). It
is shown that the incorporation of a frictional credit market can help restore the Hosios condition1
and thus improve social welfare. This is because the Hosios condition only addresses the search
externality and the hold-up problem in the traditional representative agent search and matching
model, but fails to help internalize the so-called ”average productivity effect” in a heterogeneous
skilled workers setup. We consider two cases in which workers effectively share the vacancy cost
or not, respectively. In the first case, wage contract is settled after loan contract due to sequential
bargaining protocol and workers have to share the vacancy cost, whereas in the second case, work-
ers get paid a constant share of the output out from the block bargaining protocol. In both cases,
perfect smooth credit is not desirable, and a frictional credit market can be welfare improving.
However, Hosios condition only holds when workers effectively share the vacancy cost.
In Chapter 5, I address the weaknesses of each paper respectively and discuss some extension
and future research work.
1.1 References
Albrecht, J., Navarro, L., and Vroman, S. (2010). Efficiency in a search and matching model with
endogenous participation. Economics Letters, 106(1):48–50.
Boissay, F., Collard, F., and Smets, F. (2016). Booms and banking crises. Journal of Political
Economy, 124(2):489–538.
Eaton, J. and Gersovitz, M. (1981). Debt with potential repudiation: Theoretical and empirical
analysis. Review of Economic Studies, 48(2):289–309.
Hosios, A. (1990). On the efficiency of matching and related models of search and unemployment.
Review of Economic Studies, 57:279–98.
Wasmer, E. and Weil, P. (2004). The macroeconomics of labor and credit market imperfections.
American Economic Review, 94:944–963.
1See Hosios (1990).
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CHAPTER 2. UNEMPLOYMENT AND SOVEREIGN RISK
Modified from a manuscript to be submitted to the Journal of International Economics
Jiaoting Shi
2.1 Abstract
We introduce the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) labor search framework into an other-
wise standard Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) sovereign debt model. The interactions between external
debt dynamics, domestic labor market outcomes, and time-consistent fiscal policies are analyzed.
The tension between the debt and labor market is realized through the link of the per-period bal-
anced government budget constraint. In a quantitative exercise of calibrating to Argentina economy,
we find that the incorporation of the frictional labor market improves the models ability to generate
empirically realistic debt level and default frequency. The quantitative impact of high unemploy-
ment benefit on deterring vacancy creation not only outweighs its consumption smoothing effect,
but also increases vulnerability to a sovereign debt crisis. Our model can serve as a framework for
analyzing various stabilization and social-insurance policies in the context of sovereign debt crisis
once properly extended to a dynamic labor search environment.
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2.2 Introduction
Explaining both labor market fluctuations and sovereign debt crises in a unified framework
turns out to be a new challenge in International Macroeconomics. The textbook quantitative
sovereign debt models typically assume an endowment economy and thus ignore the interaction
between domestic labor market and external debt dynamics. Recent exceptions include Na et al.
(2018) and Bianchi et al. (2017). They introduce the notion of downward nominal wage rigidity
to these models and study optimal government policies to stabilize unemployment and debt. Yet,
they are both full-employment models and thus a thorough anatomy of labor market dynamics
is missing. In the spirit of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP), we introduce a frictional labor
market featuring search and matching frictions to an otherwise standard sovereign debt model and
address (i) how default risk and fiscal policy affect the labor market outcomes, and (ii) how a
tax-financed unemployment benefit scheme affects default decision and sovereign spreads.
Exploring labor market dynamics for the analysis of sovereign default is motivated by the
concurrent evidence of high unemployment and sovereign spreads in the recent Eurozone debt crisis.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2016) report that the average unemployment rate on the periphery of
Europe 1 reached above 13 percent in 2010. This same episode is featured with the dramatic
widening in spreads of yields on 10 year sovereign bonds of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
(GIIPS) and that of Germany 2. What’s more, models with search and matching frictions, such
as Diamond (1981), Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), have become the
workhorse model for equilibrium unemployment analysis. These models capture important labor
market dynamics over the business cycle and are widely used to understand how fiscal policy affects
unemployment and output. It is then of significant importance to examine the link between fiscal
policy, unemployment, and sovereign default risk implied by these models.
The main findings in the paper are as follows. First, a frictional labor market, in combination
with default penalty, improve the model’s ability to generate empirically realistic level of debt,
1It is calculated as the arithmetic mean of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal,
Spain, Slovenia, and Slovakia.
2See Wright (2014), Figure 1.
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default frequency, and the observed volatility of country premium under plausible magnitude of
productivity shocks. Second, the quantitative impact of high unemployment benefit on deterring
vacancy creation not only outweighs its consumption smoothing effect, the continuous provision of
which also increases further borrowing costs and the probability of a sovereign debt crisis. Third, the
endogenous unemployment cost of default has contributed to government policy making, but only
with a minor effect on the decision to default or not, due to the static labor market setup. Finally,
the model cannot simultaneously account for both plausible employment level during normal times
and sizable spike-up in unemployment upon default. This finding is robust even if one adopts an
alternative calibration strategy which yields nearly 100 percent replacement ratio. As in many
other DMP models in the business cycle framework, it reflects the difficulty to get employment to
fall during downturns driven by productivity shocks.
Our production economy has four main ingredients. First, a representative household consists
of both employed and unemployed workers. This type of aggregation eliminates discrepancy in
consumption across household members by providing perfect consumption insurance within the
family. Also, the number of unemployed workers in the household represents the total unemploy-
ment rate in the economy. Second, debt issuance is conducted by the household while the default
decision is up to the central government. As illustrated by Kim and Zhang (2012), decentralized
borrowing and centralized default might lead to excessive borrowing by the private sector. This is
because individual borrowers are price-takers. They take the country premium as given and thus
fail to take into account the effect of their borrowing decisions on the interest rate. To this end,
a macroprudential style capital control tax is imposed by the government to help the household
internalize the pecuniary externality 3 , see, for example, Bianchi (2011), Korinek (2018), and Na
et al. (2018). Third, we assume government cannot commit to its future policies and characterize
the Markov Perfect Equilibria 4 (MPE). The government conduct time-consistent fiscal policies
3Pecuniary externality is not a source of inefficiency if it is merely a general equilibrium effect operated through
prices. However, they will induce severe welfare losses if the market is incomplete and there is limited enforcement.
For more discussions, see Kim and Zhang (2012) and references therein.
4The notion of Markov Perfect Equilibria can be illustrated in the following example. Consider the infinitely-
repeated game of prisoners dilemma. Two sub-game perfect equilibria are of interest. One is bad, nasty, and simple
in the sense that both players would choose to defect every period. The other one is good, meaning that if both
7
which can depend only on the current payoff-relevant state variables. That is, it should take into
account the effect of today’s policy on that of tomorrow’s, which in turn shapes the incentives and
behavior of today’s private sector due to the rational expectation, and thus the feedback from the
private sector to today’s policy making. In equilibrium, the policy making should be consistent 5
over time. Fourth, the baseline model is built with a static labor market. The separation rate of
each job-worker pair is one after production and the search and matching process re-start in every
period with all household members looking for jobs on the market. As a result, the employment
stock is no longer a state variable. This setup facilitates computation and convergence by disen-
tangling the debt and labor market in a way that the dynamics of the latter are purely driven by
productivity shocks.
The model is calibrated to match relevant moments of quarterly Argentina data for the 1983-
2001 period. I do not have the full dataset of Argentina labor market and thus certain comparisons
are missing. The matching function curvature, vacancy cost, and worker’s bargaining power are
jointly chosen to match the average unemployment rate, hiring cost to wage ratio, and the re-
placement ratio in the data. Parameters describing shocks, preferences, and the default penalty
are calibrated to match the average debt-to-GDP ratio, frequency of default, and output loss.
The model also does a good job at replicating a couple of moments that were not targeted in the
calibration, such as the positive correlation between the trade balance and the country premium.
In the calibration, the generated cyclical movements of labor market variables seem not to
match those observed in the data. The so-called Shimer’s puzzle (Shimer, 2005) still prevails in the
baseline model even if one adopts the calibration strategy proposed by Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008). This is mainly due to the slightly different interpretation of unemployment in the context
of a static labor search setup. In the model, the unemployed workers are not those who are actively
players are patient enough, by folk theorem, a triggering strategy gives that both would choose to cooperate until at
least one of them deviates, then both would choose to defect thereafter, a tit-for-tat spirit. In this example, the first
one is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium while the second one is not.
5The source of time-inconsistency does not come from the preferences per se, but from the government budget
constraint. See, for example, Klein et al. (2008).
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searching for jobs but those who couldn’t get successful matches with firm’s vacancies. The nature
of the residually determined unemployment makes it barely move.
With a fixed threshold associated with default penalty, the model can match neither the level
nor the volatility of spreads. There are two reasons. First, Na et al. (2018) argues that with risk-
neutral foreign lenders, the average country premium should approximately be equal to the average
frequency of default adjusted for the probability of being in financial autarky. Next, as pointed out
by Chattterjee and Eyigungor (2012), it is important to allow for a quadratic structure of default
punishment in generating realistic volatility of sovereign spreads.
The contribution of the paper can be evaluated in three different dimensions. First, it shows that
unemployment dynamics can play an important role in shaping the cost of sovereign default. This
channel is already highlighted in Balke and Ravn (2016) and Balke (2017) with a slightly different
approach and can complement the imported intermediate goods channel explored by Mendoza and
Yue (2012). Second, it links the labor market outcomes to debt market dynamics only through
the balanced government budget constraint, i.e., the financing need of unemployment benefit is
met by imposing the capital control tax and balanced with the residually determined lump-sum
transfer. In other words, it abstracts from any intertwined dynamics between the two markets or
any spillover effect. This could be a good reference point for evaluating the cost and benefit of
maintaining a balanced government budget constraint during the default episode. Third, it studies
the effect of high unemployment benefit in a calibrated framework. Our finding echoes that of
Krusell et al. (2010) which shows that the depressing impact of higher unemployment benefit on
firm entry outweigh its beneficial effect for consumption smoothing in terms of welfare outcomes.
Despite several missing targets from calibration, mostly due to the static labor market setup,
our model provides a starting point for incorporating the endogenous disaster dynamics recently
explored in the baseline DMP framework by Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018).
This paper is related to two large strand of literature. The first strand is the sovereign debt
framework 6 pioneered by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and formalized and developed by Arellano
6For handbook chapters, see Aguiar and Amador (2014) and Aguiar et al. (2016). For an excellent textbook
treatment, see Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017). For recent reviews on the politics and economics aspect of sovereign
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(2008) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2006). An important generalization in these quantitative appli-
cations is to introduce ex-post direct exogenous output costs of default so as to support ex-ante
empirically plausible level of external debt. Indeed, as pointed out by Bulow and Rogoff (1989), the
threat of credit exclusion alone (i.e. the reputational mechanism) cannot sustain sovereign debt,
as long as government can still save after default. This is also consistent with the negligible role of
credit market exclusion for the quantitative performance of these models (Uribe and Schmitt-Groh,
2017). Attempts to endogenize default costs include Mendoza and Yue (2012). They argue that
when domestic intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes, the decline in the imported inputs
due to credit financing exclusion necessarily leads to efficiency loss. All these models only deal with
real debt. Phan (2017) recently shows that reputation alone can sustain nominal sovereign debt
when markets are incomplete. Mechanisms other than output loss or reputation considerations to
sustain debt borrowing are highlighted by Sandleris (2008). He argues that information revelation
is crucial to enforce debt repayment as the repayment/default decision is interpreted as a signal
used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents about the
fundamentals of the economy.
The second related strand literature is the labor search and matching framework started from
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP). Recent work incorporating DMP models into real business
cycle analysis includes Merz (1995), Anfolfatto (1996) and Den Haan et al. (2000). They show
that the quantitative performance of the real business cycle model can be improved significantly
when DMP model is embedded into it. However, Shimer (2005) finds that the standard DMP
model cannot generate observed business-cycle-frequency movements in unemployment and job
vacancies in response to productivity shocks of a plausible magnitude when the model is calibrated
to U.S. data, a.k.a., the Shimer puzzle 7. The reason, as Shimer (2005) argues, is that wage is so
flexible that most productivity increase are absorbed by higher wages. As a result, the incentive
default, see Hatchondo and Martinez (2010) and Hatchondo et al. (2007), respectively. For empirical evidence,
see Tomz and Wright (2013). For discussion on the solution methods in quantitative sovereign debt models, see
Hatchondo et al. (2010).
7Most early business cycle models cannot get employment to fall enough in downturns driven by productivity
shocks. This same problem in the generic business cycle models is inherited by search models, except it’s even worse.
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for vacancy creation is eliminated and little impact is on unemployment, vacancies, and job-finding
rate. Solutions such as introducing wage rigidity, comparably high outside options for workers, and
procyclical vacancy costs are proposed 8 In our model, the wage determination by Nash bargaining
protocol is preserved since it is consistent with the wage flexibility suggested from the micro data.
Our paper is related to Na et al. (2018), Bianchi et al. (2017), Balke and Ravn (2016), and
Balke (2017) who also explicitly introduce a labor market into the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)
model. In Na et al. (2018), the government finds it optimal to devalue its nominal exchange rate
upon default to lower the real value of wages, thereby reducing involuntary unemployment inflicted
by the downward nominal wage rigidity. In this way, the Twin Ds, as emphasized in Reinhart
(2002), i.e., the sovereign defaults are accompanied by large devaluations of the nominal exchange
rate, is rationalized as an optimal policy outcome. In Bianchi et al. (2017), the option of currency
devaluation is not available either because the economy is operating at an fixed exchange rate or
equivalently a member of a currency union, and the way to stabilize the labor market and the whole
economy is to increase government spending. However, such an expansionary fiscal policy comes at
a cost of increasing sovereign spreads and the stabilization effects are shown to be highly non-linear
in the severity of the recession. In this sense, their paper joins the recent policy debate of austerity
v.s. stimulus for Eurozone crisis management. Other papers along the same line include Arellano
and Bai (2016) and Cuadra et al. (2010). All these models assume Walrasian labor markets.
Balke and Ravn (2016) also incorporate the DMP labor search framework into a sovereign debt
model to evaluate time-consistent fiscal policy . There are three main differences between theirs and
our work. First, they follow the conventional approach of centralized borrowing while we assume
that the government retains only the decisions to default and to conduct fiscal policy and let private
households borrow . In their setup, borrowing and default decisions are always optimal as long as the
government is benevolent. This is because it internalizes that the interest rate faced by the country
in international financial markets depends on its net external debt position (Uribe and Schmitt-
Groh, 2017). Second, they focus on moral hazard concerns that affect worker’s willingness to search
8See, for example, Shimer (2004), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), and Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2017).
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for jobs, as most literature on optimal unemployment insurance (UI) does. On the contrary, Krusell
et al. (2010) highlights the trade-off between insurance and job creation in a Bewley type incomplete
market model embedded with labor search frictions. Our work complements the latter by using a
representative household setup in a sovereign debt model. Third, the unemployment benefit is a
policy instrument in their framework while we arbitrarily calibrate it at a fixed level. They show
that it is optimal to reduce unemployment benefit during the recession to encourage more active
search for jobs so as to support employment. However, this result is neither consistent with the
real world policy practice nor the prescriptions offered from the optimal UI literature.
Our work is also related to the emerging literature on optimal unemployment insurance over the
business cycle. Recent papers include Nakajima (2012), Landais et al. (2013), Jung and Kuester
(2015), Mitman and Rabinovich (2015), and Pei and Xie (2017). Unlike rest of the papers, Naka-
jima (2012) allows agents to borrow and save. He quantifies the effect of ongoing UI benefit exten-
sions on the unemployment rate using a calibrated structural model that features job search and
consumption-saving decisions, skill depreciation, and UI eligibility.Mitman and Rabinovich (2015)
characterize optimal cyclical behavior of unemployment insurance and shows that it should rise on
impact when the economy is hit by a negative productivity shock but then fall during the recovery.
They assume government can commit to future policies while Pei and Xie (2017) relax this assump-
tion and examine the time-consistent policy both qualitatively and quantitatively. Both Landais
et al. (2013) and Jung and Kuester (2015) introduce shocks to the worker’s bargaining power that
are negatively correlated with productivity. Their results, on the contrary, suggest that the optimal
variation in unemployment benefits is quantitatively small and short-lived.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and charac-
terizes optimal government policies. Section 3 contains the calibration strategy and quantitative
analysis. Section 4 discusses extension. Section 5 concludes.
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2.3 The Model
The model is a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (henceforth, DMP) model embedded in an oth-
erwise standard quantitative sovereign debt framework la Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). Time is
discrete and extended into an infinite horizon. We consider a small open economy populated by
a representative household, a representative firm, and a government. In each period the house-
hold can issue a non-state-contingent bond to the risk-neutral lenders in the international financial
market.
2.3.1 The Household
The representative household consists of a continuum of workers of measure unity. Workers
can be either employed, in which case they earn market wage wt , or unemployed, and receive
unemployment benefit b from the government. In the following static labor market case, we assume
b is not a policy instrument but instead a fixed parameter to be calibrated. The household also
owns the firm and receives aggregate dividend Dt. In addition, it can borrow and lend in the
international financial market by issuing a non-state-contingent bond at price qt. Here we assume
that the household can commit to repay their debt that are subject to an ad hoc natural debt
limit. Household members 9 pool income together and achieve full consumption insurance within
the family. Thus each member consumes the same level of consumption, denoted by Ct. Let Nt
denote the number of employed household members. We assume the household are risk averse and







subject to the budget constraint
Ct + dt = wtNt + b(1−Nt) + (1− τt)qtdt+1 − Tt +Dt (2.1)
9We refer interchangeably to workers or household members.
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where τt is a macro-prudential or capital control tax on debt imposed by the government, and Tt
is the lump-sum tax (subsidy if negative). Consumption Euler equation is thus
(1− τt)qtC−σt = βEtC
−σ
t+1
The labor market contract is assumed to last for one period only. In other words, at the
beginning of each period all household members are unemployed and are searching for jobs in the
labor market. Some members find jobs and others do not. At the end of the period, all worker-job
pairs separate and the whole search and matching process restart in the next period and so on.
The number of jobs is given by
Nt = M(1, vt) (2.2)
where vt are the number of vacancies posted by the firm. The matching function is constant
returns to scale, strictly increasing and concave, and satisfies the property: M(1, vt) ≤ vt due to
the uncoordinated nature of the search process. The probability that an unemployed worker finds
a job (the job-finding rate) is thus fut = mt and the probability that an empty vacancy is filled (the
job-filling rate) is fvt = mt/vt. Labor market tightness is pinned down by vt only and we have
fut = M(1, vt) = vtf(vt), f
v
t = M(1, vt)/vt = f(vt)
note that f ′(vt) < 0. That is, a relatively tighter labor market makes it easier for a worker to find
a job but harder for a firm to get its vacancy filled. As a result, the number of unemployed workers
is given by
ut = 1−Nt = 1− vtf(vt)
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2.3.2 The Firm
The representative firm posts vacancy vt to hire workers and produce output according to a




z̃tNt − wtNt − vtk
subject to equation (2.2), where z̃t is the aggregate productivity and k is the per vacancy cost,
respectively. As will be specified later, we adopt the following form of matching function as in





The choice of the matching technology over the commonly used Cobb-Douglas specification is to
guarantee that the job-finding rate and the job-filling rate are always between 0 and 1. Solve the








2.3.3 Nash Bargaining Wages
The firm and the worker bargains over the wage rate wt according to the Nash bargaining rule.
That is, a matched worker and firm choose wt to maximize the joint product of their individual
payoffs from producing minus their ”outside options”, i.e.,
max
wt
(wt − b)η(zt − wt)1−η
where η ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative bargaining power of the worker. As η approaches to zero,
for example, the firm gets all the bargaining power. Simple algebra gives
wt = (1− η)b+ ηz̃t
15
that is, the equilibrium market wage rate is a weighted average of the marginal product of labor,
z̃t, and the workers outside option, b. Intuitively, the higher the workers outside option, or the
greater her bargaining power, the higher the wage rate she can get.
2.3.4 Government
The government sets the level of debt tax and decides whether to default or not. Following Na
et al. (2018), we assume that in each period the country can be either in good financial standing
or bad financial standing. Let It be a relevant binary variable and satisfies
It =
 1, good financial standing at t0, bad financial standing at t
Then if It = 1, the country can choose whether the repay the debt or default. If it defaults in
period t, it immediately enters into bad financial standing and It = 0. As standard in the sovereign
debt literature, a defaulted country incurs both output loss and reputation cost. Denote z̃t the
productivity level net of the loss associated with default:
z̃t =
 zt, if It = 1zt − L(zt), otherwise (2.3)
In addition, a defaulted country is excluded from any access to the international financial market
for a finite period of time (i.e. the reputation cost). In other words, when It = 0, the country
regains good standing in the next period with a constant and exogenous probability of λ, and
maintains its bad financial standing status with probability 1− λ. Thus, we have
(1− It)dt+1 = 0 (2.4)
Also, when It = 0, the government simply confiscates any debt payment to the international lenders
and rebates the proceeds to the household via either lump-sum transfers or unemployment benefit,
or both. Therefore, the governments sequential budget constraint is given by
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b(1−Nt) = τtqtdt+1 + (1− It)dt + Tt (2.5)
By a no-arbitrage condition, the equilibrium rate of return of sovereign bonds should be equal









Combining (1), (3), (4) and (5) along with the firms per period profit of Dt = z̃tNt−wtNt−vtk
yields the following good-market-clearing condition
Ct = It[qtdt+1 − dt] + [zt − (1− It)L(zt)]Nt − vtk (2.6)
Assume that ln zt obeys the law of motion,
ln zt = ρ ln zt−1 + µt
where µt is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero and variance σ
2
µ, and |ρ| ∈ [0, 1). We are now ready
to define a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2.3.1. Given processes {zt, Tt, τt, It}, the initial condition d0, and b, a competitive
equilibrium consists of stochastic processes {Ct, Nt, dt+1, ut, vt, θt, wt, qt} satisfying
Ct = It[qtdt+1 − dt] + [zt − (1− It)L(zt)]Nt − vtk (2.7)
















ut = 1−Nt (2.11)
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wt = (1− η)b+ ηz̃t (2.12)









2.3.6 Optimal Government Policy
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria in which a benevolent government chooses the level of
tax on debt to maximize households welfare subject to implementability conditions. The lump-sum
tax is residually determined in a way to balance the per period government budget constraint.
If the country is in good financial standing in period t, It−1 = 1, the value of continuing to
service the external debt, denoted as V c(zt, dt), i.e., the value of setting It = 1, is given by





+ βEtV g(zt+1, dt+1)
}
subject to the government budget constraint (5), the resource constraint (7), and two imple-
mentability constraints (11) and (12), where V g(zt+1, dt+1) denotes the value of being in good
financial standing. The value of being in bad financial standing in period t, denoted as V d(zt+1),
is given by
V d(zt) = max
Nt+1
{




λV g(zt+1, 0) + (1− λ)V d(zt+1)
]}
subject to equation (5), (11) and (12).
In any period t in which the country is in good financial standing, it has the option to either
continue to service the debt obligations or to default. It follows that the value of being in good
standing in period t is given by
V g(zt, dt) = max
{
V c(zt, dt), V
d(zt)
}





c(zt, dt) < V
d(zt)
}








I solve the model numerically using discrete state space value function iterations, see Appendix
6.1 for details. The model is calibrated to the Argentine economy in which one period corresponds
to a quarter. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, is set at 2 which is in line with much of
the related literature. The world interest rate, r∗, is set to 1 percent per quarter. The probability
of reentry,λ, is calibrated so that the average exclusion period is 7.5 years.
The curvature parameter in the matching function,ι, is set to be 3.46 as in Pei and Xie (2017).
I calibrate the fixed per unit vacancy cost, k, at 0.04 so that the model can reproduce a realistic
quarterly unemployment rate of 7.8 percent, which is not far from the average unemployment
rate of 8.3 percent from December 2002 to March 2018 period 10. The magnitude of vacancy
cost corresponds to 7.5 percent of quarterly wages, which seems empirically plausible in emerging
economies like Argentina given relatively high barriers to entry for firms.
The workers bargaining power, eta, is set at 0.64, which is also the wage elasticity to labor
productivity. Notice that in the current setup, the separation rate of worker-job pair is equal to
one. As a result, wage does not depend on labor market tightness. I pick the value of b = 0.30 and
the resulting replacement ratio is 40.72 percent that is close to Shimer (2005).
I assume that aggregate productivity follows an AR(1) process for the logarithm of z with
an autocorrelation of 91.59 percent per quarter and a standard deviation of 2.71 percent. These
moments imply that output is of 7.27 percent standard deviation. Following Arellano (2008), I
assume that when the country is in bad standing, it loses any productivity above a certain threshold
z̄, i.e.,
10Data source: CEIC Data ().
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zt − L(zt) =
 zt, if zt < z̄z̄t, if zt > z̄
2.5 Discussion
Then I estimate z̄ to be 0.9. Finally, the subjective discount factor, β, is calibrated at 0.854.
Together with the rest of the parameter values, the model produces the following three equilibrium
implications: (i) the average debt-to-GDP ratio in periods of good financial standing is about 54.7
percent per quarter; (ii) the frequency of default is 2.7 times per century, and (iii) the average output
loss is 11 percent per year conditional on being in financial autarky. Table 2.1-2.3 summarize the
values of parameters and some other selected empirical and theoretical first and second moments
11.
Table 2.1 Externally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
r∗ 0.01 risk-free return
λ 0.0333 prob. of reentry
σ 2 risk aversion
ρ 0.9159 autocorrelation
σρ 0.0271 standard deviation of µ
k 0.04 vacancy cost
Table 2.2 Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.854 discount factor
z̄ 0.90 post-default productivity
b 0.30 unemployment benefit
ι 3.46 matching parameter
η 0.64 worker’s bargaining power
11Note: All data are from Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017), except the standard deviation of country remium is
from Arellano (2008).
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Data 2.6 58.0 7.4 5.5 -0.64 0.72
Model 2.7 54.6 3.6 4.5 -0.47 0.74
From Table 2.3 we can see that the model only explains half of the observed average country
premium in Argentina (3.5 percent versus 7.4 percent per year). As highlighted in Na et al. (2018),
international lenders are risk-neutral so that the average country premium should approximately
be the same as the average frequency of default. In this sense, there is no way for the model to
explain both moments at the same time unless they are equal to each other in the data.
Another couple of unrealistic moments replicated by the model are the volatility and counter-
cyclicality of the country premium. In my model, the default penalty is set similarly as in Arellano
(2008) and Balke and Ravn (2016) in which the country loses any productivity above a certain
threshold z̄. Compared to the quadratic loss function specified by Chattterjee and Eyigungor
(2012), it induces lower volatility of the country premium and reduces its correlation with output.
Despite the shortfall , the positive correlation between the trade balance and the country premium
does match closely with the data. The intuition, as highlighted by Uribe and Schmitt-Grohe (2017),
is because international lenders would demand that the country at risk of default make an effort
to improve its financial situation by at least paying part of the interest due.
Table 2.4 and 2.5 display the first and second moments of several labor market variables gener-
ated from the model. First note that the average job-finding rate is more than twice as large as the
job-filling rate. Recall that the total measure of workers looking for jobs at the beginning of each
period is one. The lack of accumulation of employment stock thus calls for a constantly tighter
labor market to deliver realistic average unemployment level. This leads to an empirically implau-
sible vacancy rate that is larger than one. In Balke and Ravn (2016), they circumvent this issue by
introducing individual search cost. Also, my model fails to generate observed cyclical movements in
terms of unemployment and vacancy. As Shimer (2005) suggests, this is because wage is too flexible
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with respect to productivity. Intuitively, in good times when productivity is high, the wage level is
also high so that firms have no incentive to create more vacancies. To solve the Shimer’s puzzle, one
way is to use the calibration strategy proposed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). In particular,
they argue that the flow value of unemployment activities should equal that of employment. This
makes wage de facto rigid. Firms cannot adjust wage downward and thus reduce vacancy creation
during the downturn driven by productivity shocks. However, the experiment with HMs calibration
of the current model still couldn’t generate sufficiently volatile job market flows. In our baseline
model, unemployed workers are defined as those who fail to find a job in the labor market, which
is largely distinct from the usual definition in the DMP model of people who are actively looking
for jobs. The extension to a dynamic labor market is discussed in Section 4.









Model 0.74 0.31 40.71
Table 2.5 Summary Statistics: cyclicality from the calibrated Markov economy
Statistics Productivity Unemployment Vacancy
z u v
Standard deviation 0.065 0.007 0.043
z 1 -0.793 0.806
Correlation Matrix u - 1 -0.999
v - - 1
Figure 2.1 reports the dynamics of the model economy around a typical default episode under
optimal policy. This is obtained by stochastic simulations of the model for one million periods. The
first 0.1 million periods are discarded and I compute the paths of the key variables of both debt
and labor markets in three year windows around the time of default. Notice that, as predicted by
the model, the lump-sum transfer, Tt, becomes negative at default. This is because when the gov-
ernment chooses to default, it immediately confiscates any payments of households to international
lenders and returns the proceeds to households via income subsidies (Uribe and Schmitt-Groh,
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2017). After default, as long as the country is in bad financial standing, the government has to
impose a lump-sum tax so as to meet the need of financing the unemployment benefits.
Figure 2.1 A Typical Default Episode Under Optimal Policy
In regard to the fiscal policy, the macroprudential type capital control tax increases the effective
country interest-rate premium and helps private households internalize the pecuniary externality.
The net stock of external debt is going down as the country is on the verge of the debt crisis though.
Upon default, however, the unemployment increases less than half percent.
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2.6 Extension
The baseline model assumes a static labor market which leads to two unsatisfactory outcomes.
One is that the unemployment is not persistent. As a result, the model cannot generate plausible
cyclicality in terms of labor market flows. It also gives rise to an empirically unrealistic tight
labor market. The other drawback is that the labor and debt market are disentangled in the
sense that the dynamics of the former is purely driven by productivity shocks. To examine the
interactions between the two markets, we need to extend our analysis to a dynamic labor market.
As in Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018), the representative firm is now facing a different employment








(z̃tNt − wtNt − vtk)
subject to
Nt+1 = (1− s)Nt +M(ut, vt)
and
vt ≥ 0





denotes the stochastic discount factor of the firm inherited from the
representative household. Firms intertemporal job creation condition is thus given by
k
f(θt)











where µt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint vtf(θt) ≥ 0. PZK suggests
that because of the occasionally binding vacancy constraint, there exists highly nonlinear dynamics
that calls for a globally nonlinear algorithm to solve the model accurately, though they find in
simulations it is very rare for the vacancy constraint to bind.
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Also note that both sides of equation (15) depend on the tuple {zt, dt, Nt}, in which employ-
ment level Nt is a state variable. This not only makes it difficult for the numerical algorithm to
converge, but could also induce complicated government non-commitment problem if we consider
the unemployment benefit, b, as a policy instrument. Due to Nash bargaining, wage depends on the
workers outside option. The strategic interaction between the government and the private sector
in general would lead to multiple equilibria. In Pei and Xie (2017), they specify an exogenous wage
setting to facilitate numerical convergence and generate enough unemployment variance. Although
in this way, they admit that the macro channel emphasized in Hagedorn et al. () is muted since
benefit policies does not affect wages.
2.7 Conclusion
We introduce one additional element into the Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) model: labor market
is frictional. This elaboration on the standard quantitative sovereign debt model can equivalently
be described as a DMP labor search and matching model with aggregate productivity shocks and
with one extra ingredient: sovereign borrowing and default risk. We find that with static labor
search and matching setup, the model is feasible to solve despite a number of new elements relative
to earlier models with productivity shocks and virtually no propagation.
Our positive findings are that the incorporation of a frictional labor market can help the model
generate plausible debt level at good times and overall default frequency that fits the data. It
also enables the model to replicate a couple of first and second moments that are not targeted.
Specifically, it explains the observed volatility of the country premium and its positive correlation
with the trade balance. The simulation of a typical default episode under optimal fiscal policy
shows that the imposed debt tax helps private households internalize the increased sensitivity of
the sovereign spreads with respect to debt in the run up to default.
Our model can serve as a framework for analyzing various stabilization and social-insurance
policies in the context of financial crisis. The fixed level of unemployment benefit during the
recession or the recovery of the economy helps the household to smooth consumption, but comes at
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two different kinds of cost: it deters firms vacancy creation by leveraging the workers outside option,
and at the same time, increases the governments financing burden as it needs to maintain a balanced
budget constraint even during the downturns. It would be interesting to extend our analysis to
a dynamic frictional labor market with persistent unemployment and intertemporal job creation
decisions by firms. In particular, Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2018) recently explore the dynamics of
endogenous rare disasters generated by the standard search model by solving it accurately with a
globally nonlinear algorithm. The presence of an occasionally binding vacancy constraint would
help propagate and amplify the effect of productivity shocks and default penalty on the fluctuations
of unemployment and vacancies.
One dimension in which the baseline model is not empirically satisfactory is in its inability
to simultaneously generate realistic average employment at good times and enough unemployment
volatility over the business cycle frequency, even after one adopts the alternative calibration strategy
proposed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Another drawback is the relatively low subjective
discount factor. Future versions of the present settings ought to introduce long-term bond and
possibly allow the government to optimally choose both the duration and level of unemployment
benefit in a time-consistent fashion.
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2.9.1 Algorithm and method
I use discrete state space value function iterations and Brute-force grid search method 12 in
MATLAB to numerically solve for V c, V d and V g over Z× D. Here are the algorithm in steps:
1. Use 200 grid points each to cover the values of zt and dt, respectively, so the state space is
Z×D, let π denote the transition probability matrix of zt, the values of debt lie between 0 and
0.6 with equally spaced grid points. The transition probability matrix is estimated using the
method proposed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2014). Alternatively, one can follow either
Tauchen (1986) or Rouwenhorst (1995) to estimate it.
2. Specify values of parameters, construct two block arrays for d0 and z0 over Z for each grid
point in D, respectively (the dimension is 200×200×200 ), also construct a matrix for z over
D (the dimension is 200× 200 ).
3. Initialize guesses (zeros) for value functions V c, V d and V g on the grid over Z ×D, let i = 0.
4. Define indicator function df = 1{vc<vb}, start with guesses of bond price
q =
1− π · df
1 + r∗
5. For each d and z, compute Vi+1 by brute-force grid search.
6. check whether ε is less than TOL = 10−8.
7. Run simulations of the model under optimal policy for 1.1 million quarters and discard the
first 0.1 million quarters.
8. Identify default episode that are of interest.
12The programming code has largely benefited from the textbook supplemental material from Uribe and Schmitt-
Grohe (2017) and Na et al. (2018).
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2.9.2 Calibration using Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008, HM)
Table 2.6 Updated Calibration Values of Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.863 discount factor
z̄ 0.90 post-default productivity
b 0.35 unemployment benefit
ι 0.307 matching parameter
η 0.64 worker’s bargaining power















Data 2.6 58.0 7.4 5.5 -0.64 0.72
Model 2.6 56.2 3.6 6.3 -0.43 0.68











Model 9.19 4.40 91.36
In this section I report the calibration results from the baseline model using the strategy pro-
posed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). For values of parameters, four of them are updated: the
subjective discount factor, the workers bargaining power, the matching parameter, and the level of
unemployment benefit. The standard deviation of output of all times now becomes 1.43 percent,
with the quarterly hiring cost to wage ratio of 7.22 percent and average labor market tightness (or
vacancy rate) of 0.69. Table 2.6-2.9 summarize the rest results.
From Table 2.6, we can see that the HM calibration strategy gives rise to sizable improvement in
terms of the variation of vacancy rate. The intuition, is that a commensurate value of unemployment
benefit to wage rate makes workers indifferent between working on the market and staying at home.
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Table 2.9 Summary Statistics: cyclicality from the calibrated Markov economy
Statistics Productivity Unemployment Vacancy
z u v
Standard deviation 0.065 0.008 0.125
z 1 -0.812 0.823
Correlation Matrix u - 1 -0.999
v - - 1
As a result, small variations in productivity would cause large fluctuations in labor market flows.
However, the average unemployment rate now jumps up to an unrealistic level of 91.39%.
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CHAPTER 3. A TWO-COUNTRY MODEL OF BANKING CRISIS
Modified from a manuscript to be submitted to the Journal of International Economics
Mohammad Hasan and Jiaoting Shi
3.1 Abstract
Financially integrated economies observe a cross-country credit boom prior to financial reces-
sions and a bust after wards. This paper presents a two-country real business cycle model with
banking sector where privately known intermediation efficiency of banks make them heterogeneous
and gives rise to an interbank market. Overaccumulation of assets or low productivity in one coun-
try may lead to credit freeze in both financially integrated countries due to the existence of moral
hazard and asymmetric information in the interbank market. A ”sail together” financial integration
may go into a ”sink together” interbank credit freeze.
3.2 Introduction
Recent macroeconomic literature has emphasized on the propagation and amplification of ran-
dom adverse financial shocks which primarily causes the banking crises, see, for example, Gertler
and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015). However,recent studies on banking crises has
highlighted a close linkage between such crises and credit conditions as in Gorton (2012). Recent
empirical research also corroborate the existence of typical patterns across diverse episodes. There
are closed economy models of banking crises such as Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Boissay et al.
(2016). In a financially integrated world, banking crises may propagate and affect other countries.
Banking crises are rare events,they follow credit-intensive booms, and involve with multiple nations
occasionally. These stylized facts therefore call for an alternative approach of banking crises.
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When countries are financially integrated, the interbank market equilibrium may be different
than a closed economy. Moreover, the interbank crises may result from the states of other countries
and therefore the threshold level of the states may also vary for crises. A financially integrated
world may lead to spillover effects of banking crises from one country to another. These ideas
lead to the research questions: how does the interbank market operate in a financially integrated
two-country model? When do countries face inter-banking crises in an integrated world? Is there
any spillover effect of interbanking crises from one country to another? In this paper, we seek for
the answers of these questions under a two-country model.
The main finding of our paper is that when two countries are integrated through interbank
lending, banking crises result from the procyclicality of bank balance sheets of either or both of
the countries and may have spillover effects of interbank market freeze on each other. Countries
get financially integrated to ”sail together” and survive during recessions. However, due to over-
accumulation by one country both countries may fall into an interbank freeze to ”sink together”.
During expansions, credit supply increases pushing both the corporate and interbank lending rates
down. With lower rates the agency problem in the interbank market gets aggravated leading to
contractions in interbank funding. Financial integration may lead to a disastrous interbank market
freeze if total credit boom is larger than the productive use of loans.
In our model, we follow and extend the real business cycle setup with heterogeneous banks
as in Boissay et al. (2016). However, we have have a two-country world where the countries
are symmetric. Banks are heterogeneous due to the privately observed intermediation efficiency.
They can obtain funds from the depositor or the interbank market and lend to homogeneous good
producing firms. Due to the usual agency problem in the interbank market, banks can borrow and
divert funds to lower return assets and such diversion cannot either be traced or recovered by the
lending banks. Less efficient banks have more incentive to divert and diversion depends on the rate
of returns in the economy. To restrict such diversion interbank market has a borrowing capacity
resulting from the incentive compatibility constraint. However, lower return in the corporate loans
market increases the incentive for diversion and therefore market responds through lowering the
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borrowing capacity and eventually the market goes into a freeze. In a financially integrated world,
freeze in one country leads to freeze in another country for lower rates of returns.
The mechanism that leads to a banking crises in a two-country model is as follows. A sequence
of favorable, productivity shocks lead to an expansion of credit. The more efficient banks borrow
from the less efficient ones to expand their corporate loan operations. The size of the overall
banking sector increases and the economy booms. However, when the aggregate productivity
growth goes down to converge to its long-run average course, the demand for corporate loans and
the corresponding rate goes down. As a result, the interbank lending rate goes down resulting into
more incentive for less efficient banks to borrow and divert funds. Therefore, counterparty risk goes
up since the identity of these diverting banks are unknown, which in turn leads to the decline in
interbank lending activities and the market goes into a freeze. When two countries are integrated
through interbank lending, a market freeze in one country leads to a freeze in another country as
well. Either two countries have an operating interbank market or both goes into a freeze. Excessive
credit creation by one country triggers a two-country wide credit freeze. The countries may also
go into a freeze from over low productivity in either or both of the countries.
We calibrate the interbank market equilibrium of the model and assess its quantitative proper-
ties. Potentially, the model can generate banking crises in one country due to an endogenous factor-
overaccumulation of assets or an exogenous factor- low productivity or a combination of both the
endogenous and exogenous factors in a period. Moreover, the banking crises in one country shows a
spillover effect to another country, i.e., a country that could have a well-operated interbank market
without any integration, falls into interbank market freeze due to either of the factors of another
country after any financial integration. Thus, as in data, banking crises in one country are closely
linked to asset accumulation and productivity of not only its own but also another country to which
the country is financially integrated. However, we find that this story largely depends on how the
countries are integrated. In particular, the narrative is applicable if households are allowed to
deposit in domestic country only and countries are integrated through only the interbank market
and firms can only borrow capital from the domestic banks.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2.1 depicts some related literature of macroeconomic
models with financial frictions, international spillover effect, and contagion. Section 3.3 documents
the facts about financial recessions of 140 OECD countries for the period of 1870-2008 as in Boissay
et al. (2016). Section 3.4 describes the basic model with representative household, representative
firm, and heterogeneous banks. Section 3.5 characterizes the interbank market equilibrium for
both closed and financially integrated two countries which are integrated in different dimensions.
In Section 3.6, we explain the calibration parameters and the results of the interbank market
equilibrium to alternative state spaces. Section 3.7 presents the concluding remarks.
3.2.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to the macroeconomic literature with financial frictions. For instance,
Bernanke et al. (1999), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) show how
financial market frictions can amplify the financial shocks and generate long-lasting recessions.
However, the models are linearized in this line of work and this paper departs from this approach
to characterize the important and critical nonlinearities in the mechanism that drives the financial
crises. The important difference is to show that the boom-bust cycle as an outcome of credit-driven
endogenous factors given only one standard deviation to the productivity level.
In this respect, this paper is related to the literature featuring powerful amplification mecha-
nism1 resulting from financial frictions, e.g., Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) and He and Krish-
namurthy (2012). This paper is also related to the literature on sudden stops in emerging market
economies. For example, as in Mendoza and Smith (2005) and Mendoza (2010), we find that a
plausible magnitude of productivity shock can trigger a crisis if the agent is highly leveraged. These
are also open economy models similar to our model. However, our paper departs in that it does
not assume an exogenous interest rate, instead it is the endogenously generated market equilibrium
interest rate that plays a central role in the interbanking activities.
1Financial crises are inherently nonlinear events, often featuring sudden plummet in asset prices and sharp collapse
in output, while with a slow recovery rate. The most recent approach to capture this nonlinearity is to allow for an
occasionally binding constraint.
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Our paper is also related to the financially contagion literature for international business cycle
models. For example, Calvo (1995) and Chang and Velasco (1998), among others, study the
interaction of the banking system and currency markets in a crisis. Also Allen and Gale (2000)
study the financial contagion as an outcome of liquidity preference shock.
In a closely-related paper, Perri and Quadrini (2018) also shows that in a two-country model
with financial frictions, a global liquidity shortage induced by pessimistic self-fulfilling expectations
can quantitatively generate longer and deeper recessions following credit booms. The main dif-
ferences between theirs and our work are that they focus on balance sheet effect from the private
sector, i.e., the role of balance sheets in constraining borrowers from spending when financial mar-
kets are imperfect, while our work highlights the role of the wholesale banking sector at the heart
of the recent financial crisis in which credit dried up and market froze2.
A recent work3 of Gertler et al. (2019) incorporates banking panics into a standard New Key-
nesian model and captures both qualitatively and quantitatively the effects of financial collapse
on investment, output, and employment. They show that a credit boom can increase financial
instability of the system, as in Boissay et al. (2016). The sudden and discrete nature of the finan-
cial collapse characterized by the paper is induced without observing large exogenous productivity
shocks, either. Instead, banks that hold imperfectly liquid long term assets and issue short term
debts facing liquidity mismatch are vulnerable to panic failure of household to roll over deposits. A
plausible magnitude of negative capital quality shock reduces the value of banker’s capital, which
either brings banks immediately into insolvency, or leads to a self-fulling rollover crisis in which the
liquidation of assets at firesale prices forces banks into default, similar to the Cole and Kehoe (2000)
model of sovereign default but contrast with the ”early withdrawal” mechanism in the Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) model4. One of their paper’s contributions to the macro-finance literature is
that they show that banking panics (or bank runs) are quantitatively more important than non-
2See Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Curdia and Woodford (2010) for papers that
incorporate banking and Iacoviello (2005), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017) for
papers that included household debt.
3See also, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler et al. (2016).
4The traditional bank run models, starting from Diamond and Dybvig (1983), focus on the retail banking sector
in which a ”sequential service constraint” takes in effect to generate runs, i.e., only households who get to banks
early will have their money back, a first-come, first-serve scenario. However, recent bank run mostly occurs in the
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linearities coming from occasionally binding constraints, as in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012)
and He and Krishnamurthy (2012). They also managed to endogenize the probability of bank
runs by relating it to macroeconomic fundamentals. However, there are three main weaknesses
associated with Gertler et al. (2019). First, it is not clear what the negative capital quality shocks
stand for in the model if we are trying to understand the interactions between the financial market
and the real economy. Second, the paper tends to replicate what happened during the 2007-08
financial crisis but fails to match the exact timing of when the crisis occurred. This issue may be
addressed by incorporating some adjustment cost. Third, their model generates a counterfactual
faster recovery rate from the recession than in the data. The lack of persistency may be resolved by
assigning an equally important role to the real side of the economy in which household deleverages
as well in the crisis.
3.3 Financial Recession Facts
Based on data from Jorda et al. (2011), Jorda et al. (2013) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) of
140 OECD countries from 1870 to 2008, there are two facts regarding the financial recessions (Fact
1 and Fact 2). Fact 3 is built on the data from Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
• Fact 1: Financial recessions are rare events
Financial recessions are rate events in comparison to other recessions. From data collected of 196
recessions of 140 OECD countries, the average probability of a financial recession is 2.36 percent
whereas other recessions have the probability of 8.93 percent on average.
• Fact 2: Financial recessions follow credit booms
Financial recessions do not hit at a random. Instead they break out following credit booms. Credit
is 3.25 percent above the trend in the peak year prior to a financial recession in comparison to only
0.61 percent above the trend in case of other recessions.
wholesale banking (or interbank market) sector, such as the failure of Continental Illinois in 1984 and the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in 2008.
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• Fact 3 International financial recessions follow international credit booms
International financial recessions follow an increase of international credit by more than 8 percent
from the average in the peak year prior to the recession and during the financial recession the
international credit decrease by almost 13 percent from the average.
3.4 The Baseline Model
This section explains a symmetric two-country (j = 1, 2) real business cycle model with a
banking sector. Each country is populated with one risk averse representative household, one risk-
neutral representative competitive firm, and risk-neutral, heterogeneous and competitive banks with
a mass of one. For ease of notation, we exclude the country subscripts for model characterizations.
They will be re-introduced when necessary.
3.4.1 The Representative Household
There is an infinitely lived, risk averse, representative household in each of the countries. House-





where u()̇ satisfies the regularity conditions, i.e., u′(c) > 0, u(c) < 0, u′(0) = ∞, u′(∞) = 0. The
subjective discount factor of the household is denoted as β ∈ (0, 1) which is common in both
countries, and Et()̇ denotes the expectation operator. The households starts each period t with an
individual asset a. Aggregate assets are denoted A. We can think of a as either bank equity or bank
deposit and the composition of a is indeterminate due to the lack of friction between the household
and the banks. Suppose now that a is the bank deposit and the corresponding gross return on
deposits is r. Along the convention of macro-finance literature as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)
and Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that household cannot finance the firms directly due to
the frictions between them. I also assume that the supply of labor is inelastically one unit by the
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household who earns the market wage rate w for labor, obtains firm profit π, and receives a lump-
sum transfer χ corresponding to the financial intermediation cost of the banks (more explanation
will be given later in the banking sector section). A representative household therefore maximizes
her utility (3.1) by choosing the consumption and level of assets subject to the following budget
constraint
c+ a′ = ra+ w + π + χ (3.2)
3.4.2 The Representative Firm
This is a two-country model where the firm lives only for a period and produces a homogeneous
good that can be either consumed or invested. To produce the good, the firm needs to hire capital
k and labor h. The production function zF (k, h) follows a constant returns to scale technology
and satisfies the standard Inada conditions. The countries may differ due to their country-specific
total factor productivity (TFP) shocks z. However, TFP in both countries are assumed to follow
an AR(1) process:
log z′ = ρz log z + ε
′ (3.3)
where the persistence parameter |ρz| < 1 and the innovation ε is normally distributed with mean
zero and standard deviation σz. At the beginning of period t, ε is realized, before the firm decides
on the demand of capital k and labor h. At the beginning of the period t, firm is born without
any resources and depends on banks to borrow capital k at a gross corporate loan rate R. Capital
k depreciates at rate δ ∈ (0, 1). At the end of the period, the firm repays the corporate loan. For
production, the firm also rents labor from the household and in return pays w per unit of labor.
The firm chooses capital k and labor h for production to maximize its profit
π = zF (k, h) + (1− δ)k −Rk − wh (3.4)
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3.4.3 The Banking Sector
The banking sector plays a critical role in our model due to two salient features. First, there
exists heterogeneity in the intermediation skill among banks, i.e., some banks have more efficient
intermediation skills than others. This heterogeneity among banks creates an interbank market
where the least efficient banks lend to the most efficient ones. Second, following the corporate
finance literature as in Tirole (2006), there is a moral hazard problem in the banking sector along
with asymmetric information, which essentially impede the interbank market functioning. Overall,
banks perform both the retail banking and wholesale banking. On the retail side, they collect
deposits from the household and lend to firms, while on the wholesale side, they issue interbank
claims to reallocate assets among the interbank market in which low-skilled banks, during normal
times, lend to highly-skilled ones.
3.4.3.1 Banks
There is a continuum of risk-neutral, competitive banks in both countries. They are born at
the end of period t − 1 and only live for one period, i.e., banks dissolve at the end of period t.
Each bank, after birth, collects deposits a from the household. They then become heterogeneous by
drawing a random, bank-specific, intermediation skill p. Henceforth, we denote bank p as bank with
intermediation skill p. The skill p is distributed over the interval [0.1] with cumulative distribution
µ(p), satisfying µ(0) = 0, µ(1) = 1, and µ′(p) > 0. If the bank p decides to lend to the firm, then
at the end of the period there is an intermediation cost (1− p)R per unit of corporate loan, so that
the bank p earns an effective gross return of pR from corporate loan.
We abstract away from any deadweight loss concerns and assume that the household receives
a lump-sum rebate χ from the bank that is equal to the amount of the intermediation cost. These
intermediation costs may arise from the proposition, screening, and monitoring while originating or
servicing the loan. The banks can also invest into an outside project with a constant gross return
γ. To fix the idea, we refer this outside option as the storage technology which is at least as good
as just letting the good depreciate, i.e., γ ≥ 1− δ.
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Due to heterogeneity of banks in terms of intermediation skill p, in each country there is an
intra-periodic interbank market, in which low p banks lend to the high p ones at gross rate ρ.
In equilibrium, this interbank loan rate must be lower than the corporate loan rate R, otherwise
all banks would find it optimal to lend in the interbank market at a higher rate ρ than lending
to firms at lower corporate loan rate R. Similarly, the storage return γ must be lower than the
interbank lending rate ρ, otherwise all banks would find it optimal to store and not participate in
the interbank lending market. Banks p take the interbank lending rate ρ and the corporate lending
rate R as given and decides whether, and how much to borrow or lend.
Let Φ be the borrowing per deposit by a borrowing bank p, where Φ also denotes the publicly
observable and endogenous market funding ratio. If a bank p decides to borrow Φ (per unit of
deposit) from other banks at cost ρ then gets a gross unit return on deposits equal to pR(1+Φ)−ρΦ,
and lends 1 + Φ (per unit of deposit) to the firm for gross return pR. If a bank decides to lend to
other banks, instead, then the gross return on deposits is just ρ.
Gross return on deposits for bank p is then
r(p) ≡ max{pR(1 + Φ)− ρΦ, ρ} (3.5)
Bank p chooses to be a borrower in the interbank market when
pR(1 + Φ)− ρΦ ≥ ρ⇔ p ≥ p̄ ≡ ρ
R
(3.6)
Inequality (3.6) imposes a participation constraint on bank p to be a borrower, not a lender
in the interbank market. Banks with p < p̄ are less efficient in intermediation and hence lend to
the more efficient banks p ≥ p̄, and the marginal bank p̄ is indifferent between the two options.
In a frictionless world, p̄ = 1 since all banks with p < 1 would lend to the most efficient one with
p = 1 in that case. The economy would have reached the first-best allocations then. There are
two frictions prevalent on the interbank market which prevent the economy from reaching their
first-best allocation: moral hazard and asymmetric information.
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3.4.3.2 Moral Hazard
We assume that the creditors cannot trace the proceeds of the storage technology and therefore
cannot seize those diverting funds. This in turn leads to the fact that the borrowing banks may
choose to renege on their interbank debt contracts and walk away from the lenders. Therefore,
the interbank loan contracts are not enforceable. If bank p chooses to walk away with (1 + Φ)a
and invests in the storage technology, gets γ(1 + θΦ)a as payoff, where θ ∈ [0, 1] is the cost for
walking away from the interbank market after borrowing (the higher θ, the larger the cost). Such
opportunistic behavior is referred as ”diversion”, see, Hart (1995) and Burkart and Ellingsen (2004).
Corporate finance literature (e.g., Tirole 2006) refers to the diversion as a standard moral hazard
problem: (i) the higher Φ also increases the gain from diversion, and the diversion opportunity cost
increases with (ii) bank efficiency p and (iii) the spread between the corporate lending rate R and
the return on the storage technology γ. The last feature, which implies that as the corporate lending
rate goes down, banks have an incentive to walk away from the interbank market, is consistent with
the recent empirical evidence of taking high risks by the banks amid low interest rates, see, for
example, Maddaloni and Peydro (2011) and Jimenez et al. (2014).
3.4.3.3 Asymmetric Information
The intermediation skill of the banks are private information. Ex-ante lenders cannot observe
them and also cannot verify them ex post. Therefore, lenders ignore any private incentives of the
borrowers to divert funds. This makes the interbank loan contracts the same for all banks, i.e.,
neither does the market funding ratio Φ nor the interbank ledning rate ρ depends on p. However,
the lenders want to deter the borrowers from diverting. The way to deter the borrowers from
diverting is to limit the quantity of funds to the borrowers so that the least efficient banks with
p < p̄ have no incentive to pretend as high-efficiency bank and divert:
γ(1 + θΦ) ≤ ρ (3.7)
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This is the incentive compatibility constraint, which, eventually, sets a limit for Φ, i.e., the
market funding ratio above which no bank would like to lend. Hence, it can also be regarded as
the lenders’ funding tolerance. At the optimum, this incentive compatibility constraint binds and
the borrowing banks utilize the full borrowing capacity:
Φ ≡ ρ− γ
γθ
The borrowing capacity Φ increases with the interbank lending rate ρ. With a higher ρ, banks
lend more, and only more efficient banks with high p keep demanding a loan. Lenders have an
incentive to tolerate a higher market funding ratio Φ since more efficient banks have lower incentive
to divert. Therefore, there is a positive selection effect on the borrowers caused by an increase in the
interbank rate. Symmetrically, there is a detrimental effect on incentives caused by a decrease in
the interbank rate. In the limit, when the interbank rate is equal to the return on storage (ρ = γ),
the demand is null (Φ = 0) since no borrowers can commit themselves to repay.
3.5 Interbank Equilibrium
The interbank market equilibrium largely depends on whether the country is a closed economy
or integrated with other countries. We will first characterize the equilibrium of the banking sector
in one country without integration (see Boissay et al. 2016 for full details). Then, we introduce
different dimensions of integration between the two countries and characterize the corresponding
interbank market equilibrium.
3.5.1 Markets Without Integration
3.5.1.1 Interbank Market Clearing
In interbank market equilibrium of two countries without integration, the rate ρ clear the
markets. We seek for an equilibrium where the return on storage is lower than the interbank rate
(γ < ρ) so that the trade takes place (Φ > 0). In a world of two countries without any integration,
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a mass of µ(p̄) banks lend and the complement mass 1−µ(p̄) of banks borrow Φ per unit of deposit.



























The interbank market clearing condition shows that as the interbank rate ρ increases so does
the aggregate supply, while there are two opposite forces in the aggregate demand. On the one
hand, an increase in the interbank rate causes lower aggregate demand because fewer borrowers
demand funds at higher rate, which is the extensive margin effect. On the other hand, a higher
interbank rate increases the borrowing capacity and thus the aggregate demand of funds, which is
the intensive margin effect. At the aggregate level, when there are more borrowers, i.e., when ρ is
small enough the latter effect more than offsets the earlier effect. It follows that when the interbank
rate ρ is small, the aggregate demand curve bends backward and increases with ρ. The function
Ψ(ρ) is strictly convex and there exists a threshold R̄ ≡ Φ(ρ̄) for the corporate loan rate R above
which there are two equilibria with trade and below which there is no equilibrium with trade. In
the latter case, there exists a cutoff p̄ = γ/R such that banks with p < p̄ store, while banks with
p > p̄ borrow in the interbank market. We refer to such no-trade equilibrium as a banking crises.
However, such an equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the trade equilibrium and therefore we rule
out this equilibrium by assuming that banks always coordinate in the trade equilibrium.
3.5.1.2 Aggregate Corporate Loan Market Clearing
The aggregate supply of corporate loans depends on the existence of the interbank market
operations. On the one hand, when interbank trades take place, the supply of corporate loans is
A, i.e., all bank assets are channeled to the firms. On the other hand, when the interbank market
is frozen, banks with ρ < γ/R use the storage technology and the aggregate supply of corporate
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loan is [1− µ(γ/R)]A. The demand of aggregate corporate loan is determined through solving for









A, for equilibrium with trade
A[1− µ( γR)], otherwise
(3.9)
where fk(k) ≡ ∂F (k, 1)/∂k.
3.5.1.3 Interbank Loan Market Freeze
The interbank loan market freezes if and only if
A > Ā ≡ f−1k ((R̄+ δ − 1)/z)⇔ z < z̄ ≡ (R̄+ δ − 1)/fk(A)
otherwise, the interbank loan market operates. Ā is the so-called ”absorption capacity” of the
banks. This is the maximum quantity of assets that the banks can allocate efficiently. Above this
threshold there is no trade in the interbank market because of the counterparty fears. As shown in
Boissay et al. (2016), this threshold has an equivalent counterparty in terms of TFP shocks z̄, below
which the interbank market freezes. Market freezes thus result either from the overaccumulation
of assets by the household or from an adverse productivity shock that reduces banks’ absorption
capacity, or from a combination of both endogenous and exogenous factors.
3.5.2 A Two-country World with Perfect Integration
In a closed economy model the monitoring costs (1 − p)R are rebated back to the households
to abstract from any wealth effects. In a two-country model, in which one country’s savings may
end up for deposit and loans in another country, we will assume that these transfers go to the
source of savings. Suppose all capital markets and labor markets are integrated in a symmetric
two-country world. The environment is then equivalent to a closed economy with two firms. Only
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one country will produce by renting the entire world’s capital and hiring the total labor supply of
the two countries. This case is trivial.
3.5.3 A Two-country World without Labor Mobility
Now we assume that households can work only at the domestic firms. Under this restriction,
firms in both countries will operate and produce. Under integration, deposits made by household
and taken by banks, and loans made by banks may differ. Let Aj continue to be the aggregate
deposits made by households of country j, let Dj denote the deposits taken by a (ex-ante iden-
tical) bank of country j, and kj denote the loan (that equals to the capital stock) taken by the
representative firm in country j.
We consider two alternative environments in which cross-border deposits are (1) permitted or
(2) prohibited. In each of these, we in turn consider cases in which (i) cross-border interbank as
well as corporate loans are permitted, and (ii) only corporate loans are permitted, and (iii) only
interbank lending is permitted.
3.5.3.1 With Cross-border Deposit Mobility
We assume now that the depositors and the banks in either country are free to make and take
cross-border deposits.
(i). With Open Interbank and Corporate Loan Markets
In this case, banks can lend to both banks and corporate firms of either country. From the
perspective of depositors, all banks are then multinational and ex-ante identical. The total deposits
of the two countries A1 +A2 will be equally deposited at all banks, now with a mass of two. Thus
the deposits taken by each bank will be





Under interbank trade the interest rate ρ will be common across the two countries. Furthermore,
the firms’ borrowing rate R will also be common. Then, with inelastic labor supply fixed at unity,






















j Aj , for equilibrium with trade[
1− µ( γR)
]∑
j Aj , otherwise
(3.12)
where the first case holds if and only if R > R̄ > Ψ(ρ̄).
















(ii). With Open Corporate Loan Markets Only
Let us continue to assume that that household can deposit in either country’s banks. While
banks cannot make cross-border interbank loans, the firms can still borrow from banks across the
















where we have incorporated the fact that with open corporate loan market R is common across the
two countries. The above in turn implies that ρ will also be common and so will be the per unit
deposit rate. Once again, from the perspective of the depositors, banks in the two countries are
fully multinational. As in the previous case with complete banking sector integration, the deposits
are
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Dj = D =
A1 +A2
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j Aj , for equilibrium with trade[
1− µ( γR)
]∑
j Aj , otherwise
(3.14)
where the first case holds if and only if R > R̄ > Ψ(ρ̄).
(iii). With Open Interbank Market Only
We continue to assume that household can deposit in either country’s banks. While banks can
make interbank loans internationally, firms can only borrow from their country’s banks. The banks
are no-longer multinationals, instead, their opportunity sets now diverge. Hence, the deposits they
attract are no longer going to be identical. They will be determined by the equilibrium as described
below.
First note that two arbitrage conditions must hold. First, deposit rates offered by banks must
be equal across the two countries. Second, under interbank trade, no storage will occur in either
country.
Lemma 3.5.3.1. In an interbank trade equilibrium the corporate loan rates in both countries are
equalized.
Proof. Let Ψj ≥ 0 be the publicly known interbank borrowing (per unit of deposit) in country j.














Hence, Rj = R for both country j.








with no storage occurs under interbank trade, that is
k1 + k2 = A1 +A2
Finally, since the incentive compatibility constraint holds with equality, i.e., γ(1 + θΨ) = ρ,
in both countries the borrowing capacity, Ψ = ρ−γγθ must be the same. Within each country the




, is the same. Also the borrowing per unit of
deposits for the banks making corporate loans Psi is the same. This implies that
kj = Dj
Banks in each country attract an amount of deposit that clears the domestic interbank lending
as well as corporate loans. Hence, once the deposits are made, there is no need for cross-border
interbank or corporate loans.
The banking sector equilibrium within each country follows the closed economy, which leads to
the following proposition.













The converse of this result is that a banking sector freeze must occur simultaneously across the



















for both country j. Once again Rj = R for j = 1, 2 must hold and the capital used by firms must
follow the arbitrage condition as in (3.11).
Corollary 3.5.3.1. Under a banking sector freeze, the equilibrium capital allocations and corporate



























In addition, in an interbank trade equilibrium, the equilibrium rate ρ(R) continues to be deter-

























3.5.3.2 Without Cross-border Deposit Mobility
Banks in each country now take only domestic deposits
Dj = Aj (3.16)
However, their asset side has no cross-border restrictions. We now sequentially consider the three
alternatives.
(i). With Open Interbank and Corporate Loan Markets
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The banking sector equilibrium in this case is fairly similar to the previous first case, except
for the size of the banks’ balance sheets. Banks now have access to only domestic pool of deposits.









must hold. However, now we have kj 6= Dj = Aj . That is, firm in country j may be borrowing from

















































j Aj , for equilibrium with trade[
1− µ( γR)
]∑
j Aj , otherwise
where the first case holds if R > Ψ(ρ̄).
(ii). With Open Corporate Loan Markets Only
Here, banks can make cross-border loans to firms and therefore R must be equal in the two
countries. Banks can make within country interbank loans. Let ρj denote within country interbank
















Obviously, Ψ : ρ→ R is common for both countries.
Proposition 3.5.3.2. With open corporate loan markets, within country interbank lending rates
are equal.








must hold. However, as in the previous case, kj 6= Aj . And the world economy will jointly


























j Aj , for equilibrium with trade[
1− µ( γR)
]∑
j Aj , otherwise




(iii). With Open Interbank Market Only
Under interbank trade, once again, ρ will be common in both countries. However, corporate




+ A2µ(p̄2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreign Supply
= A1[1− µ(p̄1)]Φ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Domestic Demand
+A2[1− µ(p̄2)]Φ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Foreign Demand
Using Φ1 = Φ2 = Φ =
ρ−γ
γθ , and p̄j =
ρ
Rj

































= −µ2(1 + Φ)− Φ
µ1(1 + Φ)− Φ




for j ∈ {1, 2}.
It is not possible to characterize the properties of R1 and R2 as a function of ρ. Instead, we need
now to characterize ρ as a function of R1 and R2. It furthers complicates the multiplicity problem
by perhaps increasing its dimensionality. One may have to address this numerically. Suppose a





Rj + δ − 1
zj
)
, for j = 1, 2 (3.18)












, for j = 1, 2 (3.19)
Under a closed economy, the aggregate supply of corporate loans in normal times would be the
total deposit collected by the banks. However, equation (3.19) is a novel finding the our paper
where the aggregate corporate lending does not only depend on the savings of the households, i.e.,
A, but on other factors as well, such as the corporate lending rate R, interbank lending rate ρ, and
the storage components, γ and θ.
There are now five unknowns in the model: {R1, R2, k1, k2, ρ}. If an equilibrium exists, they
should sensibly solve the five equations: (3.17), (3.18), and (3.19).
If there is no solution to the above problem, then we are back in the crisis world. Both countries













Rj + δ − 1
zj
)
, for j = 1, 2
while the amount stored in each country equals µ( γRj )Aj .
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We conclude this subsection with presenting the banking sector’s return on deposits. The return
on deposits depends on three factors: corporate loan revenue, interbank lending revenue, and the






0 pρdµ(p), and the interbank borrowing cost
∫ 1
p̄j
pρΦdµ(p). The banking sector’s



















in which under the equilibrium trade, the first term represents the interbank lending revenue of
a mass of µ(p̄j) banks that are lenders, and the second term denotes the corporate loan revenue
plus the profit from market funded capital for a mass of (1− µ(p̄j)) banks that are borrowers. In
contrast, when there is no equilibrium of trade, no banking intermediation exists and, a mass of
µ(γ/Rj) banks find it optimal to use the storage technology.
Before we proceed to the quantitative analysis, a general equilibrium of the world economy
in which two countries connected only with open interbank market is defined as follows. The
state variables for a particular individual’s optimization problem in country j at time t are (i) the
individual asset holdings ajt , (ii) the aggregate asset holdings {A1t, A2t}, and (iii) the realization of
the technology shocks {z1t, z2t}. Let st = {A1t, A2t, z1t, z2t}. In the sequel, we denote by Γj(st) the
perceived law of motion of aggregate assets in the country j and by Rj(st), rj(st), and ρ(st) and
wj(st) the pricing functions for corporate loans, deposits, interbank loans and labor, respectively; we
also denote by πj(st) and χj(st) the profit and rebate functions. All these functions are function
of aggregate assets {A1t, A2t} and productivity {z1t, z2t}, which are both taken as given by the
household and capture the presence of externalities. The household j′s recursive optimization
problem writes as
V (at, st) = max
at+1,ct,nt
u(ct − υ(nt)) + βEtV (at+1, st+1)
subject to
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at+1 + ct = r(st)at + w(st)nt + π(st) + χ(st)
At+1 = Γ(st)
where, in the calibrated version of the model, u(x) = x1−σ/(1− σ) and υ(n) = n1+ν/(1 + ν). The
solution to this problem is a set of decision rules a(ajt , st), n(ajt , st), and c(ajt , st).
The firm’s problem in country j is simply given by maxkt,ht ztF (kt, ht) + (1− δ)kt − w(st)ht −
R(st)kt, which leads to the decision rules k(st) and h(st). Finally, the solution of banks’ problem
in country j leads to the aggregate loans l(st) and φ(st) = (ρ(st) − γ)/γθ, where only aggregate
assets enter the solution due to the linearity of the problem. In the recursive rational expectation
equilibrium, actual and perceived law of motions coincide in each country j, respectively.
Definition 3.5.1. (Recursive competitive general equilibrium) A recursive competitive equilib-
rium of the world economy, given the aggregate state st = {A1t, A2t, z1t, z2t}, is a sequence of
prices defined by the pricing functions R(st), r(st), ρ(st) and w(st), two perceived law of mo-
tions for aggregate assets Γ1(st) and Γ2(st), and a set of decision rules for each country j = 1, 2
of {c(ajt , st), a′(ajt , st), k(ajt , st), h(ajt , st), φ(ajt , st), l(ajt , st)} with the value function V (ajt , st)
such that,
1. {c(ajt , st), a′(ajt , st), n(ajt , st)} and V (ajt , st) solve the household j′s recursive optimization
problem taking Rj(st), rj(st), wj(st), πj(st), χj(st) and Γj(st) as given.
2. {kj(st), hj(st)} solve the firm j′s optimization problem taking Rj(st), wj(st) as given.
3. φj(st) solves the bank’s optimization problem taking Rj(st), rj(st) and ρ(st)as given. Aggre-



















4. The perceived law of motion for aggregate assets is consistent with the actual law of motions:
a′j(at, st) = Γj(st).
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5. Wages satisfy wj(st) = zjtFh(kj(st), hj(st)), and the corporate loan rate satisfies Rj =
















where p̄j(st) ≡ ρ(st)/Rj(st)
6. The aggregate intermediation cost rebated to the household is given by χj(st) = (Rj(st) −
rj(st))Ajt− (Rj(st)− γ)(Ajt − kj(st)), and the firm j′s profits are equal to zero, πj(st) = 0.
7. Goods, labor, capital and interbank markets clear:
cj(Ajt , st) + a
′
j(Ajt , st) = zjF (kj(st), hj(st)) + (γ + δ − 1)(Ajt − kjt) + (1− δ)Ajt






























8. The banking sector’s absorption capacity is given by


















Following Boissay et al. (2016), we investigate the quantitative properties of the model using
the calibrated values of parameters presented in Table 3.1.
For the Foreign country, we use the AR(1) estimates that are consistent with those of the pe-




β 0.971 Discount factor (Deflated for growth)
ν 0.500 Inverse of Frisch elasticity
ϑ 0.945 Labor disutility
σ 2.000 Risk aversion
α 0.300 Capital elasticity
δ 0.100 Capital depreciation rate
ψ 1.012 Growth factor
σzh 0.013 Std. of productivity shock in Home country
σzf 0.030 Std. of productivity shock in Foreign country
ρz 0.890 Persistence of productivity shock in both Home and Foreign country
λ 26.000 Bank distribution: µ(p) = pλ
θ 0.085 Diversion cost
γ 0.952 Storage technology
Table 3.2 Model Statistics on Recessions
Financial Other All Severe Mild
Events 644 4708 5352 1784 1784
Frequency(%) 1.29 9.42 10.70 3.57 3.57
Duration(years) 2.16 1.34 1.43 1.98 1.04
Output Loss(%) -10.79 -3.31 -4.21 -7.38 -2.13
using the collocation method, with decision rules iterations as in Boissay et al. (2016), allowing for
discontinuities in the asset accumulation at the points at which the economy switches regime.
We first analyze the response of the Home country to a positive one standard deviation produc-
tivity shock, when the economy is initially at the steady state associated with the long-run average
of zt. Figure 3.1 compares the dynamics in the model (thick plain line) with those in a frictionless
model (round markers). The responses of output, hours worked, consumption, and investment are
relatively larger than those in Boissay et al. (2016). The intuitive explanation is that due to a
larger size interbank market, our two-country model exhibits much more amplification than the
closed-economy model as well as the frictionless RBC model.
Figure 3.2 and 3.3 report the typical path to financial recessions of the Home country and
Foreign country, respectively. These are depicted from the simulation of the model over 50,000
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Figure 3.1 Impulse response to a one standard deviation technology shock
Figure 3.2 Typical path to financial recessions in the Home country
periods with the years of recessions and crises identified. By convention, period 0 corresponds to
the period when the financial recession (or the crises) bursts. Note that in the simulation, only the
Foreign country is hit by the shock so that its banks’ absorption capacity (thick plain line) as well
as the endogenous dynamics of banks’ assets (thin plain line) cross out with each other around the
crises, while those in Home country are relatively stable.
Since two countries share the interbank market, the Home country experiences financial reces-
sions due to the contagion effect. Figure 3.4 shows the dynamics of the output and credit gaps
around recessions in the Home country.
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Figure 3.3 Typical path to financial recessions in the Foreign country
Figure 3.4 Dynamics of output and credit gaps around recessions in Home country
Compared with that in the closed economy, we see that the relative size and duration of financial
recessions from simulations both increase in the world economy. Thus, they confirm that the model
generates deeper and longer financial recessions than other recessions, which are associated with a
boom-bust cycle in the credit. However, our two-country model generates financial recessions with
a frequency of 1.29 percent, nearly 50 percent lower than that in a closed economy (See Boissay
et. al. 2016, page 519). In other words, the very nature of a shared interbank market makes
the economy less susceptible to negative productivity shocks, but the resulted crisis are more
pronounced if they occur. The intuition is that, an internationally integrated interbank market
endowed with a relatively larger ”absorbing capacity” acts as a shield against negative shocks and
fluctuations, which makes crisis less frequent. Rationally anticipating this, borrowers have more
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incentive to leverage and the gain from diversion increases as well. The interbank moral hazard
issue potentially becomes more severe and implies larger macroeconomic contractions once induced
by a crisis.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we offered a two-country model of banking crises. Banks are heterogeneous with
respect to their private intermediation efficiency. This heterogeneity gives rise to an interbank
market. However, due to the moral hazard problem along with private intermediation skills, less
efficient banks may have an incentive to borrow in the interbank market and divert funds at a lower
return asset. A borrowing capacity constraint restricts these less efficient banks from diverting the
funds. However, a lower corporate lending rate and interbank rate increases the incentive of these
banks to divert funds and the interbank market responds by lowering the borrowing capacity. At
some point, the interbank market goes to a freeze if the rates of return are sufficiently low.
A sequence of favorable productivity shocks lead to an expansion of credit. However, when the
productivity growth goes down from an increasing trend, corporate lending rate goes down along
with the demand. Counterparty risk goes up and the market stops lending to each other. When
two countries are integrated through interbank lending, a market freeze in one country leads to a
freeze in another country as well. Either two countries have an operating interbank market or both
go into a freeze. Excessive credit creation by one country triggers a two-country wide credit freeze.
The countries may also go into a freeze from over low productivity in either of the two countries.
In this paper, we made some strong assumptions for tractability reasons and presented a stylized
model. Indeed, we left out some features of the banking sector that would deserve attention for
future extensions. For example, we assume that households cannot lend the firms directly and firms
cannot issue any equity or debt securities. Moreover, we assume firms do not default on their loans.
Another possibility would be time-varying return on the storage technology. All these extensions
are left for future research.
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CHAPTER 4. EFFICIENT FRICTIONS: FROM CREDIT TO LABOR
MARKET
Modified from a manuscript to be submitted to Economics Letters
Jiaoting Shi
4.1 Abstract
We introduce ex-ante heterogeneous skilled workers and endogenous labor market participation
a la Albrecht et al. (2010) into a single-period version of credit and labor market search model as in
Wasmer and Weil (2004). It is shown that Hosios condition fails to achieve constrained efficiency
since the resulting labor market is too tight, and credit market frictions can be welfare improving.
In particular, we consider two cases in which workers effectively share the vacancy cost or not,
respectively. In the former case, wage contract is settled after loan contract and workers have to
share the vacancy cost, which helps restore constrained efficiency at Hosios rule given a sufficiently
but not too much tight labor market that is induced by appropriate credit frictions. In the latter
case, workers get paid a constant share of the output and the presence of a frictional credit market
can be welfare improving. In both cases, perfect smooth credit is not preferred, and credit market
freeze is always reducing welfare.
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4.2 Introduction
It has been well-documented in literature that credit market imperfections give rise to high un-
employment and low output and amplify macroeconomic volatility through a financial accelerator,
see, e.g. Acemoglu (2011), Wasmer and Weil (2004). Recent financial crisis and the induced slow
recovery of labor market in United States also highlight the importance of an integrated approach
by incorporating both credit and labor market frictions in a unified framework 1 to analyze the
effects of a credit crunch and its implications, see, for example, Buera et al. (2015).
In a recent paper, Albrecht et al. (2010) (hereafter, ANV) shows in a simple labor search model
that Hosios rule, as in Hosios (1990), fails to yield constrained efficiency. In their model, het-
erogeneous skilled workers choose to either participate in market production or engage in home
production. When Hosios condition holds, there are excess entries of workers due to too many
vacancies posted in equilibrium. In other words, labor market is too tight. The source of this
inefficiency, as suggested by ANV themselves, is that Hosios condition only internalize search ex-
ternalities while have the average productivity effect unaccommodated, i.e. the increased entry
of marginally less productive workers contributes to a lower equilibrium level of expected market
output and thus reduces social welfare.
Instead of pursuing a somewhat generalized Hosios rule (Julien and Mangin, 2017), we take
a different attempt to restore efficiency by considering a more general setup that features real
world frictions pertaining to labor market. Indeed, in ANV, one of the reasons that there are too
many vacancies posted in equilibrium is because it is implicitly assumed that entrepreneurs find no
frictions to pay for the vacancy cost so as to recruit workers. In real world, however, it is usually
the case in which firms search for and bargain with bankers or investors in order to finance the
cost of opening a job vacancy, due to credit market imperfections even at normal times. Hence, we
decide to tackle the problem by bringing back to the center stage a credit market in a fashion as in
the seminal work by Wasmer and Weil (2004). The basic insight is that by lowering labor market
tightness through a general-equilibrium interaction, credit market imperfections can be welfare
1See Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2017) for a formal textbook treatment.
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improving. In particular, in equilibrium, entrepreneurs now find it difficult to get matched with
bankers due to search and matching frictions in the credit market. As a result, less vacancies can
be created and only sufficiently productive workers choose to participate in market production.
We consider two different cases as for how market wage is determined in equilibrium since it
directly affects workers decision-making of entry. In the first case, labor search comes before credit
search (see fn.3) and as a result, workers get paid a constant share of their output. An immediate
implication of this arrangement is that the marginal workers productivity as well as the average
market productivity are both decreasing in the job market tightness. In other words, a relatively
tighter labor market is always preferred from the workers perspective so that it attracts marginally
less productive ones to enter, which leads to inefficiency, as in ANV.Thus, the adding of a frictional
credit market does not necessarily help the economy restore its constrained efficiency at Hosios
rule, since it changes nothing but only to increase the effective vacancy cost that falls solely on
the entrepreneurs burden. However, we find that the economy with credit market frictions can be
more desirable than the one with perfect smooth credit. By lowering the equilibrium labor market
tightness, credit market imperfections can improve welfare. We also show that credit market freeze
in which firms are unable to get any financing at all is always undesirable as in equilibrium no
vacancy could be opened on the market and all workers get stuck at home production.
In the second case, we emphasize the potent role of credit frictions by letting loan contract settle
before wage contract. Since banker enjoys a first-mover advantage in this sequential bargaining
game, workers have to share the vacancy cost in contrast to the previous case. As a result, there
emerges a threshold of labor market tightness beyond which the cut-off entry productivity and
average market productivity increase as labor market becomes more tight. This is because even
though it is more likely to get paired with an entrepreneur in a tighter job market, the wage payoff
is nevertheless decreasing. It is shown that constrained efficiency can be restored at Hosios rule in
a sufficiently but not too much tight labor market induced by appropriate credit market frictions.
This additional outcome is delivered exactly through the common sharing of vacancy cost for all
market participants which drives the internalization of individual workers output effect upon entry.
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That is, marginally less productive workers are deterred from entry as they rationally choose to
avoid the un-affordable expected vacancy cost. Comparing to the first case, it turns out that which
market search comes first matters for the efficiency.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to address the welfare improving role of credit search
and matching frictions in the labor search framework. This surprising result contrast sharply to
the conventional wisdom which suggests that credit market imperfections generally be associated
with welfare losses, and that a perfectly smooth credit market will tend to allocate resources
more efficiently. On the contrary, we find that certain market frictions can be welfare enhancing,
and may also restore the constrained efficiency at Hosios rule under appropriate market search
sequence. However, the improved efficiency comes at the cost of higher equilibrium labor market
unemployment and lower output.
4.2.1 Related Literature
Some papers in recent literature have also extended ANVs basic environment. Examples include
Gavrel (2011), Charlot et al. (2013), Masters (2015), and Julien and Mangin (2017). In particular,
Gavrel (2011) shows that if the social planner is allowed to maximize the welfare with respect to
both job creation (i.e. ∂W∂θ ) and market participation (i.e.
∂W
∂y∗ ), the resulted market participation
would be too high, while the labor market tightness is actually partially efficient. He then finds
that subsidizing non-participants could improve market efficiency and reduce unemployment. This
prescription is based on the implicit assumption that public policy can influence the participation
decisions of workers. On the contrary, our paper shows that market efficiency can be enhanced in a
laissez-faire regime through the introduction of a credit market with efficient frictions. Julien and
Mangin (2017) have also managed to restore efficiency by proposing a modified version of Hosios
condition that captures not only the standard search externalities but also the dampening effect of
marginal workers on the average market productivity upon entry. An important difference between
these papers and ours is that they all choose to directly tackle the issue, while in our model, the
interaction between the credit and labor markets largely alters both entrepreneurs and workers
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decision making of entry, and emphasizes the importance of incorporating credit frictions to the
traditional labor search model in terms of welfare analysis.
Several recent papers exploit the idea that asset market frictions can be welfare improving,
see for example Berentsen et al. (2014) and Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016). In these
papers, agents fail to internalize the pecuniary externality in the portfolio choice when trading at
the secondary asset market. Berentsen et al. (2014) argues that the optimal policy response is to
restrict full access to the financial market. Our paper shares a similar spirit to that of Geromichalos
and Herrenbrueck (2016), who find that the equilibrium welfare is always higher in the model where
the secondary asset market is a frictional over-the-counter (OTC) market, if the inflation is not too
high.
In a closely-related paper, Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) examines the effect of a credit crunch on
the total factor productivity (TFP) in a dynamic general equilibrium model featured with hetero-
geneity in firm productivity and endogenous job creation and destruction. He shows that adverse
shocks to credit market destroy those least productive jobs and thus raise both aggregate TFP and
unemployment . There are two main differences between Petrosky-Nadeau (2013) and our paper.
First, he does not characterize the equilibrium efficiency, while we do, though at a static setting.
Second, we show that at normal times a frictional credit market can improve social welfare and is
more desirable than perfect smooth credit, though a complete credit market freeze always reduces
social welfare. Thus, we consider our work as a complement to his.
Finally, Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) extends the credit and labor search model in
Wasmer and Weil (2004) to show that financial frictions add an additional entry cost to job creation
costs and create labor markets cyclical volatility. They also find that the elasticity of labor market
tightness to productivity shocks is increasing in total financial costs, and can be minimized at the
credit-market Hosios condition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and show
the main results of the paper. Section 3 concludes and suggests future work.
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4.3 The Model
The basic environment is a single period version of the economy as in Wasmer and Weil (2004).
There are three types of agents in this economy: a continuum of entrepreneurs who cannot operate
alone and need funds to start up the business, a continuum of bankers that have sufficient resources
to finance the project, and a measure 1 of workers that can produce and realize the entrepreneurs
ideas into output.
The timeline of events is as follows. In the first stage, an entrepreneur goes and finds a banker
who agrees to pay for the vacancy cost γ to recruit a worker. The search costs for the entrepreneur
and the banker are c and k, respectively. Notice that search costs are non-pecuniary and can be
interpreted as time and effort spent on it. The probability that the entrepreneur meets with a





where φ = E/B is defined as credit market tightness from the point of view of firms, given as
the ratio of the number of entrepreneurs E to the number of bankers B that are searching in this
market. Thus the probability that a banker meets with an entrepreneur is MC(E,B)/B = φ · p(φ)
and we have dp(φ)dφ < 0, and
d[φ·p(φ)]
dφ > 0.
In the second stage, the successfully matched entrepreneur goes to the labor market to recruit





in which θ = v/u is labor market tightness and similarly we have q′(θ) < 0, and d[θ·q(θ)]dθ > 0. The
worker does not incur any search cost but need to choose between whether to participate in the
labor market or not in the first place. In particular, she will get a payoff of z (leisure or payoff
2As in Pissarides (2000), the matching function MC(E,B) (so is ML(v, u), see below) is assumed increasing in
both its arguments, concave, and homogeneous of degree 1 (or constant returns to scale); e.g. Cobb-Douglas form
MC(E,B) = χCE
1−εBεand ML(v, u) = χLv
1−ηuη where χC and χL are scale parameters. This is one of the simplest
way in catching matching frictions. In the basic setup, as pointed by ANV, this also suggests that all workers have
an equal chance of finding a job, regardless of their individual productivity.
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from home production) with certainty if she chooses to stay out of the labor market. Otherwise,
she will get a payoff based on her individual market productivity y, the bargaining protocol (see
details below) over how to split the output, and labor market tightness. Workers productivity y
is a random draw from a continuous cumulative distribution function F (y) with the support [0, ȳ]
and is i.i.d. across workers. If she chooses to search for an entrepreneur, the matching probability
is θq(θ), and if she fails to get matched, the payoff would be zero. Apparently, there exists a cutoff
value of y∗ above which the worker finds a higher expected payoff of participating in the labor
market.
In the third stage, the output is split according to some (predetermined) bargaining protocols
among the entrepreneur, the banker, and the worker. We consider two cases here. The first case
is that the worker will get a fraction α of the output y that she produces, as in ANV. Then the
rest (1− α)y will be split between the entrepreneur and the banker according to Nash bargaining.
One way to think about this case is that when negotiating, the worker is actually facing with a
joint venture of the entrepreneur and the banker. The asymmetric treatment 3 of the bargaining
positions of the three agents is a mere reflection of the fact that the search as well as the vacancy
cost incurred by the venture entity are irreversible and workers are the only productive ones in the
economy.
The second case is the sequential bargaining game as in Wasmer and Weil (2004): the en-
trepreneur first 4 negotiates with the banker over the loan contract in stage 1, and then bargains
with the worker who decides to participate in the labor market over the wage contract in stage
2. Thus, we need to solve this game backward and as will be clear later, this would have a very
different implication for the workers entry decision.
3Another way to formalize this is to put labor search first and then credit search, and γ should instead be
interpreted as, say, a fixed capital cost financed through bankers. The key is that worker does not effectively share
γ .
4This would be a more realistic structure for those start-up firms. In this case, banker issues debt first and thus
is more senior than the residual claimants, i.e. entrepreneur and worker.
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1−F (y∗)dF (y) denote the average market pro-
ductivity of workers, w the wage rate, ρ the payoff to the banker, and (y −w− ρ) the firm’s profit
5.
4.3.1 Case I: worker gets paid of α · y
In this case, a worker participates in the labor market if and only if αy · θq(θ) ≥ z, that is,
y ≥ y∗ = z
αθq(θ)
≡ h(θ) (4.1)
note that h′(θ) < 0, i.e., the marginal worker’s productivity decreases as labor market becomes








v = MC(E,B) = Ep(φ)
since only when the entrepreneur and the banker get matched can the vacancy be posted through






















so dθdE > 0.
Banker and entrepreneur share the surplus of their joint venture according to the generalized
Nash bargaining rule





(1− α)ŷ − ρ
)1−β
5We will hereafter refer interchangeably to entrepreneurs or firms.
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where β ∈ (0, 1) measures the banker’s bargaining power within the venture, and (1−α)ŷ indicated
that sharing rule is of the expected leftover. The expected repayment to the banker is thus
ρ = β · (1− α)ŷ + (1− β) γ
q(θ)
(4.3)
which is essentially a weighted average the expected total surplus of the venture and (compensation
for) the effective vacancy cost.
In equilibrium, free entry of bankers and entrepreneurs on the credit and labor market ensures
that
−k + φp(φ)[−γ + ρ · q(θ)] = 0
and
−c+ p(φ) · q(θ) · [(1− α)ŷ − ρ] = 0

















in which the left-hand side are the effective search costs while the right-hand side are the corre-
sponding benefits. Note that the equilibrium credit market tightness is given by taking the ratio






which depends only on the features of the credit market. Also in the limit, as credit matching
becomes frictionless (i.e., p(φ) → +∞ for all φ), equilibrium labor market tightness θ → θ̄, where
γ/q(θ̄) = (1− α)ŷ. We thus have the following lemma 6
6This is basically a variant of Corollary 1 from Wasmer and Weil (2004).
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Lemma 4.3.1.1. The average market productivity ŷ decreases with labor market tightness θ . As
a result, credit market imperfections lower equilibrium labor market tightness: θ∗ < θ̄.




1−F (y∗)dF (y) in which y





















To show θ∗ < θ̄, we prove by contradiction. Suppose instead θ∗ > θ̄, then ŷ(θ∗) < ŷ(θ̄) and
q(θ∗) < q(θ̄). However, from equation (4.5) we know this cannot be true since
γ
q(θ∗)















a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that θ∗ < θ̄
Now we can characterize efficiency. The social planner is trying to choose the number of
entrepreneurs 7 E to maximize





dy − γv − kB − cE (4.6)
where the social welfare is the sum of home production and market production, net of the following
cost in total: the vacancy cost, and the search cost in the credit market incurred from both bankers
and entrepreneurs. Directly taking derivatives gives
7Once E is determined, the number of bankers, B, can be calculated from that v = MC(E,B) since θ =
v
1−F (h(θ))












yf(y)dy − θq(θ)y∗f(y∗)h′(θ) dθ
dE
− γp(φ)− k/φ− c
= z − y∗θq(θ) + ŷθ[q(θ) + θq′(θ)]f(y∗)h′(θ) dθ
dE
+ [q(θ) + θq′(θ)]p(φ)ŷ − γp(φ)− k/φ− c















where we evaluate dW/dE at Hosios condition α = −θq′(θ)/q(θ), replace the second dθ/dE in the
first equality with (4.2), and use free entry conditions (4.4) and (4.5) to yield the last equality
above.
When Hosios condition holds, in equilibrium there are too many entries of entrepreneurs, which
give rise to too many vacancies posted (since φ∗ = E/B is fixed and v = MC(E,B)). As a result,
labor market tightness is too high. Thus, our finding is robust and consistent with that of ANV.
This is because in our setting, the introduction of a frictional credit market changes nothing but
only to indirectly increases the vacancy cost for the entrepreneur. This can be easily revealed by





if otherwise only labor search is considered in the analysis, as in ANV. From the social planners
perspective, choosing an optimal number of entrepreneurs E is equivalent to setting an optimal
level of vacancy cost γ. In the Appendix, however, we show that if the government can freely
choose γ, which can be rationalized either as a tax or license fee charged in practice, in equilibrium
there are insufficient vacancies created and the labor market tightness is too low at Hosios rule.
Back to the current setup, we already know that θ∗ < θ̄, which means credit search and matching
frictions might improve social welfare by lowering equilibrium labor market tightness as compared
to the case of perfect smooth credit. This is done by deterring the entry of less productive workers
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through the general-equilibrium interactions between credit and labor markets, which contrasts
sharply to the conventional wisdom that in general credit frictions only lead to lower social welfare.
However, we remind our readers with some caveats to the above conclusion. In fact, as p(φ)→
0, dθ/dE → 0 (see equation (4.2)) and dW/dE → 0, and we get E = 0 and W = z. That is, when
credit matching becomes impossible, no entrepreneurs enter and as a result, all workers choose to
disengage in market production. In this sense, a severe financial crises like the one in 2008 that cause
an almost complete credit market freeze would heavily reduce the average market productivity, and
lead to high equilibrium unemployment and low output in the economy (see Petrosky-Nadeau,
2013).
More formally, we have the following proposition
Proposition 4.3.1.1. When Hosios condition holds in the labor market in which workers get paid
a constant share of their output, there are excess entries of entrepreneurs and the equilibrium labor
market tightness is too high. Search and matching frictions in the credit market can be welfare
improving by deterring the entry of less productive workers via a less tight labor market. However,
perfect smooth credit is never desirable and credit market freeze always leads to welfare losses.
Proof. See above.
Example 4.3.1.1. We assume that F (·) follows Pareto distribution as in Petrosky-Nadeau (2013)
and adopt the following parameters’ values as shown in Table 4.1. Then we compute the social
welfare in two cases: one in which p(φ) = 1, the other where p(φ) → ∞, i.e., frictionless credit
market from the perspective of entrepreneurs and thus v = E. Table 4.2 presents the results. 8
Indeed, as pointed out by Julien and Mangin (2017), the standard Hosios condition only inter-
nalizes search externalities but fails to capture the so-called output externality and participation
externality in the model of heterogeneous workers with respect to productivity, see, also, Julien
















Table 4.1 Summary of baseline parameter values
Scale m / curv. µ 0.1 / 1.1 ȳ 2
Credit matching Labor matching
level χC 7 level χL 0.66
elasticity ε 0.5 elasticity η 0.72
bank barg. power β 0.2 worker barg. power α 0.72
Credit-market search Labor-market search
Bank cost k 0.003 vacancy cost γ 0.13
Entrep. cost c 0.003 home production z 0.32
Table 4.2 Social welfare w./ credit frictions and w./o it
W E v ŷ θ
frictionless credit mkt. 0.3262 0.1414 0.1414 0.7607 1.1147
frictional credit mkt. 0.3263 0.1359 0.1359 0.7617 1.0812
and Mangin (2016). Moreover, as we have assumed workers being in a relatively condescending
bargaining position compared to the joint venture of entrepreneurs and bankers 9, the former do
not share the cost of posting a vacancy, which also adds to a layer of excess entry and thus worse
the equilibrium allocation. Credit market frictions can only mitigate but not fully eliminate this
source of inefficiency.
What happens if the wage contract comes after the loan contract is determined? In the sequen-
tial bargaining case discussed below, as we would expect, now workers have to take into account the
vacancy cost since bankers enjoy the first mover advantage when negotiating with entrepreneurs.
Moreover, credit market frictions improve social welfare only when the induced labor market is
sufficiently tight, with which it restores constrained efficiency at Hosios rule.
9This assumption can be rationalized either as a result from the collective bargaining of labor union, or simply as
a legal requirement by government. For example, firms in United States in need of recruiting high-tech immigrant
workers are supposed to sponsor their employees working visa application as well as to pay a prevailing wage in that
position, according to the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 101(a)(15)(H).
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4.3.2 Case II: a sequential bargaining game
In this case, we solve the model from backward by first characterizing the wage bargaining
between workers and entrepreneurs, then the loan bargaining between entrepreneurs and bankers,
and finally pinning down the workers entry decisions.
Workers and entrepreneur share the surplus according to the generalized Nash bargaining rule
by taking ρ as given
w = arg maxwα(y − w − ρ)1−α
where α ∈ (0, 1) measures the worker’s bargaining power. The wage payoff to the worker is
w = α(y − ρ) (4.9)
also ∂w/∂ρ = −α. The banker, having anticipated the above negotiated outcome, solves the
following





(y − w − ρ)1−β
and we get




where βα = β/[1−α(1−β)] is the ”effective” bargaining power of the banker, and ρ with a similar
interpretation to (4.3). Combining equation (4.9) and (4.10), we get the payoff to the worker,
banker, and entrepreneur, respectively



















In contrast to the previous case, equation (4.11) implies that worker’s realized share is reduced
from α to α(1−β), of (y−γ/q(θ)) instead of y. In other words, the sequential bargaining structure
endows the worker with a lower effective bargaining power and forces her to share the vacancy






· θq(θ) ≥ z






which suggests that the relationship between the cut-off value y∗ and the labor market tightness θ
be no longer monotone. We thus have the following
Lemma 4.3.2.1. Both the cut-off productivity y∗ and the average market productivity ŷ, are in-
creasing in labor market tightness θ, if and only if







where η = −θq′(θ)/q(θ) is the matching elasticity of the worker. When θ < θ1, both y∗ and ŷ are
decreasing in θ.
Proof. Check h′(θ) and use Lemma 4.3.1.1.
This lemma warrants some discussion. Because wage is decreasing in labor market tightness
(see equation (4.11)), as θ increases, even though it becomes more easier for workers to find jobs
on the market (since d[θ · q(θ)]/dθ > 0), they also have to share a large amount of vacancy burden
10, i.e., γ/q(θ). Thus, y∗ (and so does (̂y)) initially falls with θ but later on only highly productive
workers are willing to enter when labor market becomes sufficiently tight. The related threshold,
θ1, increases with the payoff from home production z and the banker’s bargaining power β, and
decreases with vacancy cost γ, worker’s bargaining power α, and its matching elasticity η. For
10Note that 1/q(θ) in the duration for an entrepreneur to find a worker. Since q′(θ) < 0, the effective vacancy cost,
γ/q(θ), increases as the labor market becomes more tight.
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example, a higher γ would induce a wider range of θ in which y∗ is increasing since only more
skilled workers can afford to share the vacancy cost.

















the characterization of efficiency is thus given by, from equation (4.6) evaluated at Hosios rule
dW
dE









if θH < θ1, h
′(·) ≤ 0 and dθ/dE > 0, dW/dE < 0; if θH < θ1 but h′(·) > 1−F (y
∗)
θf(y∗) , dθ/dE < 0,
dW/dE < 0 as well. Only when θH > θ1 and 0 < h
′(·) < 1−F (y
∗)
θf(y∗) it is possible that dW/dE = 0, in
which θ1 < θ
H < θ̄.
Example 4.3.2.1. In this example, we use the parameters’ values from Table 4.1 except that now
z = 0.2 and β = 0.01. The labor market tightness are, θ1 = 0.3904, θ
H = 0.8667, and θ̄ = 1.8330,
respectively. The social welfare are, W (θ̄) = 0.2909 while W (θH) = 0.4797 and dWdE ≈ 0. Again, we
have shown that a frictional credit market is preferred to the one with perfect smooth credit, and
moreover, it also helps restore the efficiency at Hosios rule (at least locally).
We now have the following proposition
Proposition 4.3.2.1. When labor market wage contract is determined after the loan contract in
credit market, workers effectively share the vacancy cost since banker now enjoys the first-mover
advantage. A frictional credit market can be welfare improving and is thus preferred to a frictionless
one. In particular, constrained efficiency can be restored at Hosios rule (at least locally) if the labor
market is sufficiently but not too much tight.
Proof. See above.
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Some readers might be wondering why in this case the constrained efficiency can be restored
at Hosios rule. This is because the workers decision making process of entry is altered in the
current search sequence, and effectively, they have to share the vacancy cost now. In the first
case, labor search goes before credit market search (see fn.3) and a tighter labor market is always
preferred from the perspective of all workers. Thus, Hosios condition fails to accommodate those
extra effects other than the search externalities. In case II, however, the expected wage payoff is no
longer monotonically increasing in the labor market tightness since the search sequence is reversed,
i.e. credit search comes before the labor market search. A tighter market makes it easier for a worker
to find a job, which nevertheless increases her sharing burden of the vacancy cost at the same time.
As a result, only highly productive workers would choose to engage in market production. It is
through the individual workers internalization upon entry of her output externality that helps the
economy regain the constrained efficiency at Hosios rule. In other words, search sequence matters
for efficiency.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that credit search and matching frictions can lower equilibrium
labor market tightness, and thus might improve social welfare and help restore efficiency at Hosios
rule. In particular, when the bargaining structure is built in the way so that workers need to
share the vacancy cost, it helps the economy achieve the constrained efficiency at Hosios condition.
Otherwise, the workers output externality cannot be internalized and the equilibrium labor market
is too tight. In addition, a perfect smooth credit market is never desirable since it would induce too
many vacancies posted in equilibrium. Credit market freeze would lead to a complete shutdown of
the labor market and reduce the social welfare as well. The study of efficiency characterization in
a dynamic setup with endogenous job destruction is left for future research.
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4.6 Appendix
In this Appendix, we revisit ANVs basic environment and show that, if the government can
charge the total vacancy fee (or equivalently, charge a tax or license fee in addition to the market
vacancy cost), the resulted labor market tightness is too low at Hosios rule. Since now entrepreneurs
vacancy cost is a source of government tax revenue, they cancel each other in the aggregate income,
and the social welfare is given by




where m(θ) is the worker’s probability of getting employed in the labor market, and y∗ = zα ·m(θ)























f(y∗) + γ(1− F (y∗))
}
> 0
that is, less than the optimal amount of vacancies are posted in equilibrium. In other words, the
vacancy fee charged by the government is too high and a deviation from Hosios rule might be
optimal.
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CHAPTER 5. FUTURE WORK SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
One way to address insufficient fluctuations in the labor market in Chapter 2 is to extend the
search and matching model into a dynamic setup in which firms live forever and the job-worker pair
operates for a given period of time that is pinned down by an explicit probability of separation. In
this sense, we will need to solve an occasionally binding vacancy constraint as in Petrosky-Nadeau
et al. (2018). Also, the model may generate multiple labor market equilibria if both the level
and duration of the unemployment benefit become part of the policy instruments and a selection
criterion is thus needed.
For Chapter 3, it is of great interest to calculate the welfare cost of a frictional interbank-
ing market as well as the ”savings glut externality” as emphasized in Boissay et al. (2016). In
addition, it would be more interesting to both qualitatively and quantitatively characterize any
macro-prudential or time-consistent government policies that explicitly address the inefficiencies
and/or externalities. An extended evaluation of government programs such as pre-crisis saving
tax or post-crisis financial bailout would help us better understand the interactions between the
financial frictions and real economy.
As mentioned in Chapter 4, once properly extended to a dynamic search and matching frame-
work, the role of a frictional credit market in terms of deterring pre-crisis less-efficient vacancy
creation can then be examined quantitatively. In this sense, it may complement the recent work
of Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2013) in which the existence of a frictional credit market helps
destroy those inefficient jobs in the post-crisis era and speed up the recovery of the economy.
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